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ABSTRACT 
While many historians have maintained that the Provisional and First Confederate 
Congresses both served as legislatures intent on obstructing Jefferson Davis’s policies, 
these southern assemblies actually provided little notable resistance to the president.  
Congressmen who did oppose Davis’s policies never coalesced into a formal opposition. 
This lack of cohesion resulted from two factors: the Confederacy’s eschewal of political 
parties following secession from the Union and the inability of disgruntled solons to 
organize an oppositional faction thereafter.  When objections to increased centralization 
of the war effort came, they were from individuals who acted alone or in small factions.  
Consequently, Davis had a vast majority of his desired policies enacted during the period 
from February 1861 to February 1864. 
 
 
  1
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Jefferson Davis’s 1881 work, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 
the former president lamented that the rigid belief in states’ rights continually plagued the 
Confederacy and resulted in the nation’s defeat.  Historians continue to wrestle with 
Davis’s argument that the Confederacy “died of a theory.”1  Any serious examination of 
Confederate political culture, particularly the workings of Congress, must address the 
validity of the hypothesis.  The best test of the premise is through analyzing the ability of 
Congress to take the initiative regarding such issues as conscription, the suspension of 
habeas corpus, impressments and taxation, and granting Jefferson Davis greater control 
of the war effort.  For early scholars of the Confederacy such as Frank Lawrence Owsley 
and Albert Burton Moore, the impact of states’ rights was all-encompassing and served as 
the prime motivator for Davis’s opponents in Congress.2   
From the 1960s to present day, historical treatments of the Confederate Congress 
have undergone significant transformation.  Starting with Buck Yearns’s 1960 book, The 
Confederate Congress, the influence of states’ rights as an explanation for congressional 
opposition has diminished considerably.  While he wrote that states’ rights did contribute 
to some of the opposition, Yearns maintained that Davis’s expanding powers as 
commander in chief during wartime served as the major cause of dissent for a hesitant 
and unsure legislature.3  Two landmark quantitative studies, Thomas B. Alexander and 
                                                 
1 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,  (2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1881), I, 
581. 
2 Frank Lawrence Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); 
Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (1924.  Reprint, Columbia: South 
Carolina University Press, 1996). 
3 Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960), 222-227. 
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Richard E. Beringer’s The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress and Kenneth Martis’s 
The Historical Atlas of the Congresses of the Confederate States of America: 1861-1865,  
also strove to explain congressional division.  For Alexander and Beringer, old political 
allegiances, concerns about one’s constituency and its proximity to conflict, one’s view 
of secession and Union, and the changing course of war tended to predicate one’s loyalty 
or opposition to Davis.  Martis, on the other hand, unswervingly claimed that one’s 
location determined the depth of allegiance to the nation’s cause.  He argued that only 
congressmen from regions under Federal control or heavily disrupted by combat 
supported Davis’s centralization of the war effort, primarily because they knew such 
measures could not be readily enforced in their home districts.4   
I maintain, on the other hand, that that Davis’s opposition in the Provisional and 
First Congresses was diffuse and often negligible.  These congresses, which met the 
demands for the nation’s defense and established the framework of government, usually 
complied with their president’s desires to give the executive greater control of the 
nation’s war effort.  From February 1861 to February 1864, Jefferson Davis requested 
Congress to supply him with such measures as a military draft, the permission to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus, federalized methods of taxation and impressment, and approval 
of military appointments and strategy.  Congress tended to comply with his wishes; 
modifications or rejections of his requests were rare. When antagonism came, it was 
generally from individuals who were incapable of coalescing into an organized 
opposition that could alter Davis’s course. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), 68, 322, 329; Kenneth Martis, The Historical Atlas of the Congresses 
of the Confederate States of Americ,a: 1861-1865 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).   
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONFEDERACY’S FIRST YEAR OF GOVERNMENT, 
FEBRUARY 1861-FEBRUARY 1862 
 
 
 
 
 Following Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860, seven states in the 
Lower South held special legislative sessions or formed conventions to examine the 
prospect of severing ties with the United States.  Although the process of secession 
differed from state to state, a majority of the congressional representatives or convention 
delegates in each of these states agreed that they could no longer participate in the Union.   
One by one, they withdrew from the Union before Lincoln’s inauguration in March of the 
following year.1  Answering South Carolina’s call for a national convention of seceded 
states, the other six states agreed to assemble in Montgomery, Alabama in order to create 
a new central government.   
The compositions of the state commissions to the Montgomery meeting were 
highly divergent, however.  South Carolina and Mississippi both had stridently 
secessionist delegations that outsiders regarded as radical ideologues.  The 
representatives from Alabama had to contend with a sizable constituency in the northern 
districts that favored cooperation with the Union, not the chosen path of secession.  
Florida had an apprehensive electorate that waited to approve of disunion until they 
sensed that their neighbors Alabama and Georgia would act decisively.  Georgia, in turn, 
had a considerable number of citizens harboring Whiggish political sensibilities and 
                                                 
1 Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960), 3.  The dates of 
secession for the “original seven” states of the Confederacy are as follows: South Carolina on December 
20, 1860; Mississippi on January 9, 1861; Florida on January 10, 1861; Alabama on January 11, 1861; 
Georgia on January 19, 1861; Louisiana on January 26, 1861; and Texas on February 1, 1861.  Due to 
Texas’s relatively late date of secession, Congress did not admit her delegation until March 2, 1861. 
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reservations about leaving the Union.   Louisiana was slower in her acceptance of 
secession, primarily due to New Orleans’ prominence as a domestic and international 
trade hub.  She also had a highly lucrative sugar industry that enjoyed the protection of 
the national tariff, unlike many other southern agricultural products. State delegates 
would even attempt to retain protective tariffs once the Provisional Congress convened, a 
motion that the other states flatly rejected.2  Texas was a hotbed for secession, but the 
staunchly Unionist governor Sam Houston thwarted the state’s efforts to break away from 
the United States until late January 1861, when the popular sentiment became so 
overwhelming that the governor finally relented.3   
 The newly independent states sent delegates to Montgomery on February 4, 1861 
hoping to create a new national government while their constituents’ approval of 
secession remained strong.  Popular vote did not determine the selection of envoys; state 
legislatures or newly formed secession conventions chose the representation.4  Almost all 
emissaries were men of affluence; few held estates valued at $10,000 or less.  As Thomas 
Alexander and Richard Beringer note in The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress, “it is 
apparent that the roll-call divisions in the Provisional Congress were not significantly 
associated with personal economic status of the members.” Slavery was thoroughly 
                                                 
2 Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865, Volume I (5 vols; Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), 59-60.  Hereafter cited as JCC. 
3 Emory Thomas, The Confederate Nation (New York: Harper Row, 1979), 46-56. 
4 The processes employed to select provisional congressmen remains a controversial topic.   Paul Escott’s 
AfterSecession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 
1977) argues that state legislatures and secession conventions bypassed the ballot box when choosing 
delegates due to voters’ initial confusion over the choice to secede.  As a result, state officials hurriedly 
formed the Confederacy before doubts became widespread.  Buck Yearn’s The Confederate Congress, 
George Rable’s The Confederate Republic (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1994) and Emory Thomas’s The 
Confederate Nation give a much more positive assessment.  They maintain that an overwhelming number 
of Confederate voters approved of the choice to secede and had faith in their state officials’ actions.  Rable 
and Thomas also are in general agreement that the nation’s citizenry overwhelmingly supported their new 
government.  The dearth of protests over the electorate’s chance to voice their approval or disapproval for 
the establishment of the Confederacy signaled approval.  Most considered elections to validate 
Montgomery solons’ actions superfluous.   
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entrenched in the South of the 1860s.  Not surprisingly, an overwhelming number of 
these prosperous solons possessed human property.  The size of slave holdings did vary 
among congressmen, but relative wealth or the number of bondsmen one possessed did 
not result in much division at all in legislative matters.  Slavery served as a unifying 
element for the Provisional Congress.  Much like the social and political elites that 
constituted the upper tiers of the Confederate armies, Confederate congressmen had the 
most to lose if they could not maintain their new nation’s independence.5 
 The infant nation hoped to eliminate the influence of political parties; with 
secession, many hoped that old Whigs and Democrats would now unite as Confederates.6 
While latent political animosity between former party adherents did emerge in First and 
Second Congresses, the Provisional Congress largely escaped partisan antagonism.  The 
lack of hostilities among Montgomery delegates was not surprising.  After all, wealthy 
southern Whigs and wealthy southern Democrats living in a predominantly agrarian 
region, the two groups comprising the bulk of the Provisional Congress, were both very 
likely to own slaves.  Despite longstanding political differences pertaining to the size and 
scope of municipal, state and federal government, southern elements of both parties 
strenuously defended their right to maintain their domestic institution of bondage.7  
 Delegates’ positions on secession would prove to be a more divisive issue.  Initial 
opposition to secession mostly came from some old-line Whigs, but many former party 
                                                 
5 Thomas Benjamin Alexander and Richard E. Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), 78-90. 
6 The original seven states’ delegations numbered 34 former Democrats, 23 former Whigs, and 3 delegates 
whose prior party affiliation was either undeclared or unknown.  The addition of the remaining six states of 
the Confederacy yielded a final total of 62 former Democrats, 44 former Whigs, and 10 members with 
unknown or undeclared party affiliations.  A quantitative overview of former party affiliation is available in 
Alexander and Beringer,  Anatomy of the Confederate Congress, 36. 
7 E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1950), 8-11. 
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members found preservation of slavery to be more important than upholding the Union.8  
Others harboring Unionist or cooperationist sentiments wanted to wait and see how 
Lincoln would execute his office. State legislatures and conventions sent large numbers 
of these lukewarm Unionist advocates and moderate secessionists to Montgomery in 
order to counter the radical impulses of fire-eating original secessionists.  Men such as 
William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama, South Carolina’s Robert Barnwell Rhett, Albert 
Gallatin Brown of Mississippi, Georgia’s Henry L. Benning, Virginia’s Edmund Ruffin 
and Beverley Tucker, and Louis Wigfall of Texas laid the political groundwork for this 
movement in the 1850s. By 1860, most Southerners agreed with the fire-eaters that 
Northern political aggression was too much to bear.  Many Southerners, however, found  
these radicals “inflexible” and often “personally difficult and politically obtuse, and they 
were consistently unable to forge meaningful coalitions even among themselves, let alone 
ally with the many shades of moderate opinion throughout the South.”9  Restraint would 
guide the founding the new nation; the fire-eaters would be largely marginalized by the 
time the Congress ratified the permanent Constitution.  Their choice for the presidency 
and their vision for the framework of government would never materialize.  “Unable to 
get along with each other or anyone else,” David and Jeanne Heidler argue that the fire-
                                                 
8 The original seven states’ delegations had 38 delegates favoring secession, 20 who initially favored 
cooperation with the Union, and 2 whose opinion was either undeclared or unknown.  With the addition of 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, the final totals were 58 
secessionists, 45 Unionists, and 13 undeclared or unknown.  Alexander and Beringer,  Anatomy of the 
Confederate Congress, 36;  Georgia Lee Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy (1934; Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2000), 4. 
9 Quote from David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, “Fire-Eaters,”  ed., David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. 
Heidler, Encyclopedia of the American Civil War (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 699;  Emory Thomas, 
The Confederate Nation, 61;  Rable, The Confederate Republic, 67. 
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eaters “were again demoted in popular esteem to the rank of unreasonable men with 
dangerous opinions.”10 
 Soon after the representatives assembled, the notorious fire-eater Robert 
Barnwell Rhett nominated Howell Cobb as the chair to preside over the Provisional 
Congress.  Cobb had a formidable record of political service as a U.S. congressional 
representative, the governor of Georgia from 1852-1854, and James Buchanan’s treasury 
secretary.  The heretofore-ambitious Cobb seemed curiously content with his possible 
leadership within the makeshift legislature and confided that he did not hold aspirations 
for higher office in the nascent Confederacy. In a letter to his wife, Cobb observed that 
“from all I here there is a general disposition to make me president of the convention.  It 
is thought that my taking that position will exclude me from the Presidency of the 
Confederacy and some of my friends doubted on that account the policy of my taking it.”  
However, Cobb insisted, “in this I differed from them and have determined to follow my 
own judgement.  The truth is that the Presidency of the Confederacy is an office I cannot 
seek and shall feel no disappointment in not getting.”  Despite his refusal to consider the 
presidency, he retained a sense of sanguinity regarding the forthcoming proceedings.  
“There is at present much diversity of opinion as to the course to be pursued in the 
formation of a provisional government, but there is a general good feeling and 
predisposition to unite and harmonize on whatever may be found the best policy.  I feel 
confident all will work out in the end.”11  
 
                                                 
10 David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, “Fire-Eaters”, Encyclopedia of the American Civil War, 700. 
11 Cobb to His Wife, 3 February 1861, ed. Ulrich B. Phillips, Correspondence of Robert Toombs, 
Alexander Stephens, and Howell Cobb,  1911 Annual Report of the American Historical Association, Vol. 
II (Washington: American Historical Association, 1913). 536-537. Hereafter cited as Correspondence.  
  8
Convention representatives quickly approved of Rhett’s choice of Cobb on the 
first day of meeting and then set about creating a new government.   Agents assembled in 
a unicameral legislature and states’ delegation numbers equaled the size of their prior 
allocations in the United States Congress.  Each state was allowed one vote to decide 
matters.  Majority approval or rejection by a state’s delegation resulted in an aye or nay 
vote; a split decision yielded the casting of an undecided vote.  This framework governed 
the Provisional Congress for the next year. 12 
 The newly formed Provisional Congress confronted two pressing challenges 
towards establishing a legitimate government: the need for a new constitution and the 
absence of an executive.  Congressional representatives immediately took measures to 
rectify both problems.  In a February 5, 1861 open session, Christopher Memminger of 
South Carolina presented a resolution calling for the establishment of a provisional 
central body to govern the seceded states.  In a secret session that same day Howell 
Cobb’s brother, Thomas R.R. Cobb of Georgia  successfully moved for the swift election 
of an interim president and vice-president and for the provisional body to last no longer 
than twelve months.  The Congress accomplished both goals.  By February 9, 1861, 
delegates chose their provisional executives; by February 17, they were inaugurated and 
executing the duties of their offices. Congress elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi as 
interim president and Alexander Stephens of Georgia as the temporary vice-president.  
Then, the First Congress, with a membership largely determined by popular vote, 
                                                 
12JCC, I, 7-16.  Alexander and Beringer, Anatomy of the Confederate Congress, 74-76; Kenneth Martis, 
The Historical Atlas of the Congresses of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster: 1994) 7-8, 89-90. 
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assembled for formal proceedings in Richmond, Virginia on February 18, 1862, barely 
more than a year later.   
 As delegates pondered the makeup and future of the executive and legislative 
branches, they drafted and adopted a provisional constitution.  On February 7, a 
committee of twelve led by Memminger offered a document virtually identical to that of 
the United States.  The next day, delegates amended the text.  Most congressmen were 
devout constitutionalists and saw no need to adopt major changes to the new code of 
laws.  Excluding changes that would bolster states’ rights and strengthen the protection of 
chattel slavery, most delegates wanted no major alterations.  Consequently, solons made 
few protests to the provisional document.  Duncan Kenner of Louisiana raised objections 
to the word “nation” in Article 1, Section 6.1 and the committee quickly omitted it.  
Entitled the “Constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of 
North America”, many delegates found the word “north” as odious as the word “nation” 
– if not more so.  Consequently, the document’s authors removed it as well.  With a 
minimal amount of protest, the Montgomery delegates adopted their new constitution on 
February 8, 1861.  A twelve-man committee, led by Rhett, then began the process of 
forging a permanent document.13 
 The constitutional committee labored for five weeks on a permanent constitution, 
which Congress unanimously adopted on March 11, 1861.  Much like the provisional 
constitution, the Confederacy’s new framework for government closely resembled the 
U.S. Constitution.  Many Confederates had few grievances with their former nation’s 
constitution.  Most Confederate leaders, such as Jefferson Davis, regarded themselves as 
                                                 
13JCC, I, 25-39;  James D. Richardson, ed.,  A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, Vol. I, (2 vols., Nashville: United States Publishing Company, 1906). 3-14. Hereafter cited as 
M&P.  
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devout constitutionalists.  Indeed, they viewed themselves are the true adherents to the 
principles of the American Revolution and guardians of the Constitution, not their former 
countrymen in the North.  Rather than continue in a Union with northern states that 
appeared intent on irreparably altering the nation’s laws and economy, the leaders of the 
Confederacy saw no other choice but secession in order to preserve their constitution and 
way of life.   
A comparative analysis of the two nations’ constitutions reveals many 
similarities.  The new Constitution imposed many limitations on states’ powers similar to 
the old Federal document; state sovereignty was far from absolute. State officers were 
required to take an oath of loyalty to the Confederacy and to uphold and maintain their 
new Constitution.  The same restrictions on states’ rights mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution were also in the new Confederate document.  Laws issued by the national 
government continued to take priority over those proclamations and decrees emanating 
from state legislatures.  Once a seceded state joined the Confederacy, it lost the privilege 
to ally independently or make treaties with other nations or states.  Other restrictions 
placed on the states included the denial of the privilege to coin or print currency, the 
inability to pass ex post facto legislation or bills of attainder, and forswearing of the right 
to maintain an army or navy in peacetime.  Just as the Constitution precluded the states 
the ability to engage in independent treaties or alliances, it also denied states the capacity 
to wage war on their own accord.  One major loophole for heightened central powers 
remained.  The “necessary and proper” clause was also part of the Confederate 
constitution – a provision that Jefferson Davis would rely upon in future years to press 
for increased centralization of the war effort. 
  11
 Several significant alterations emerged, however.  The discernable variations 
from the Union centered on a reiteration of states’ rights, protections for chattel slavery, 
and revisions of governmental processes.  Protections of states’ rights in the Constitution 
were alternately implicit and overt.  The constitutional committee never addressed a 
state’s right to secede from their new nation in the text, though the new document did not 
specify it as illegal.  Most congressmen and most loyal Confederates, for that matter, 
vociferously believed that states retained that privilege.  Confederate state legislatures 
and secession conventions predicated their decision to dissolve their political ties to the 
United States and to create a new country on the belief that American nationhood resulted 
from a compact of states that could voluntarily join and depart from their mutual alliance 
at any time they saw fit.   Since all seceded states recognized the validity of each other’s 
departure from the United States, then certainly a Confederate state maintained the right 
to secede from the nascent republic if the day arose when an individual state found its 
condition within the national framework to be unsatisfactory.   
Besides the implicit approval of secession, the tangible changes to the document 
revealed a newly stressed emphasis on states’ rights and slavery.  No longer a “more 
perfect union,” the states were now regarded as “sovereign and independent” bodies 
working together to establish and maintain “a permanent federal government.”  To 
placate fears of tyrannical federalism within southern borders, officials of the 
Confederate central government “resident and acting solely within the limits of any 
State” were eligible for impeachment by state legislatures.  Congress could enact no 
national law denying an individual’s “right of property in negro slaves.”   Additionally, 
the permanent constitution circumvented fears regarding the legality of slavery in newly 
  12
acquired Confederate territories and states. Section 9.4 permitted slaveholders to 
transport their property to all corners of the Confederacy, irrespective of that locality’s 
laws or position on human bondage.  Although some delegates made efforts to revive the 
international slave trade, concerns over the depreciation of domestic slave values and 
potential alienation of sympathetic Border States in the Upper South won out.  Section 
9.1 maintained the ban on foreign importations of Africans; Section 9.2 denied “the 
introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this 
Confederacy.”14 
  Several notable changes in legislative and executive procedure occurred.  
Maintaining the old spirit of Southern conservative constitutionalism that preceded 
secession and confederation, the Constitution prohibited Congress from proposing new 
amendments.  Instead, the Constitution placed the initiative for change in the hands of the 
states.  Ratification of the permanent Constitution would come from two-thirds approval 
by state legislatures or special conventions. No changes to the Constitution occurred 
during the Confederacy’s lifespan, however.  Congress could neither implement a 
protective tariff nor adopt internal improvements.  Budgetary legislation had to show 
specific amounts allotted and explicit reasons for expenditure.  A two-thirds vote from 
both houses was necessary for any disbursement of governmental funds.  In order to 
prevent pork-barrel spending or the insertion of legalistic loopholes, each bill could only 
address one matter and the legislation’s intent had to be clearly expressed in the bill’s 
title.   The executive’s term in office was limited to a single six-year term; many 
                                                 
14 Copies of the Confederacy’s Permanent Constitution are in M&P, I, 3-14 and Rable, The Confederate 
Republic, 307-322.  Discussion of the attempts to revive the international slave trade are in Rable, The 
Confederate Republic, 51-53 and Alexander & Beringer, Anatomy, 98. 
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Confederates hoped such a policy would elevate the presidency above the fray of 
internecine politics and preemptively curb abuses with patronage.     
In sum, The United States and the Confederate States had remarkably similar 
constitutions.  “Ironically,” George Rable notes, “the most striking feature of the 
Confederate Constitution was not its Southern orientation.  The permanent Constitution 
prescribed for the Confederacy much the same kind of union which the Southerners had 
dissolved.”15  Nevertheless, political theory differed from actual practice.  Article 3 called 
for a Supreme Court but no such judiciary materialized during the Confederacy’s 
lifetime, primarily because of war.  As a result, the nation’s federal government 
encompassed only the executive and legislative branches.  Managing the war effort 
consumed Jefferson Davis and the Congress; they were far too busy executing their own 
duties to provide an adequate check on state courts. Instead, Confederate states had their 
own districts, which combined district and circuit courts. Although the state district 
courts generally ruled in favor of Confederate policies, states such as Georgia and North 
Carolina would become increasingly contentious concerning judicial matters.   The 
Confederacy also lacked organized political parties unlike the United States, which 
retained a vibrant party system.  Although the Republican party dominated the U.S. 
Congress, the Democratic party provided loyal (and in some cases, not so loyal) 
opposition to moderate and radical Republican initiatives.   
 The Confederacy’s eschewal of political parties resulted in a lack of organized 
loyal opposition.  The looming conflict with the North also inhibited much open dissent.  
Buck Yearns expertly summarized congressional hesitance to offer coordinated means of 
political resistance.  He argues, “. . . during a war, when survival issues face the 
                                                 
15 Rable, The Confederate Republic, 64. 
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government in quick succession, indecision seems weakness and inaction seems almost 
treasonable.  If Congress passes an unpopular administration, it shares the responsibility 
of that measure with the president; if Congress rejects an administrative measure, it is 
considered uncooperative; if Congress proposes alternatives to the president’s 
suggestions, it is considered discordant.”  Like most American wartime Congresses, 
Yearns stresses that the Confederate Congress had considerable difficulty itself, “for all 
considerations in the Confederacy were secondary to winning the war.”16 
In the place of well-coordinated and formalized groups that countered the Davis 
administration with alternative measures for administering the war effort and solving 
domestic issues, short-lived, often tentative and largely inchoate factions emerged.  
Within this political context that the Confederate Congress conducted its business.  
 ●     ●     ● 
Shortly after arriving in Montgomery, provisional envoys selected Jefferson Davis 
and Alexander Stephens as provisional president and vice-president.  The first week of 
meetings generated little overt campaigning for the presidency.  A former U.S. senator, 
publisher of the acerbic Charleston Mercury, and the acknowledged “father of secession,” 
the fiery Robert Barnwell Rhett felt he deserved the seat but did not campaign on his own 
behalf.  Fellow South Carolinians assembled in Alabama did not push for his nomination; 
other delegates mindful of projecting a moderate image to prospective Confederates in 
the Upper South balked at the prospect.  Conservatives were alarmed by his radical 
desires for the permanent Constitution, including the resumption of the international slave 
trade.  Particularly disconcerting was the “Great Debate,” in which Rhett, William P. 
Miles of South Carolina and T.R.R. Cobb proposed to exclude free states from future 
                                                 
16 Yearns, The Confederate Congress, vii.  
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admission into the Confederacy.  John G. Shorter of Alabama would eventually offer an 
acceptable compromise measure:  a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Congress 
would admit new states.  Once Congress ratified the document, conservatives relegated 
Rhett to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.  Ezra Warner and Buck Yearns note that for 
“the balance of the war he joined his son on the Mercury to mount a vitriolic attack on 
Jefferson Davis, his administration, his appointments, [and] his strategy. . .”17  Most also 
deemed William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama, another of the leading fire-eaters, to be 
too radical and vituperative to be a serious candidate.  After failing to gain significant 
diplomatic concessions during his stint as a European commissioner, Yancey returned to 
the Senate and became a vocal critic of Davis before dying in July 1863.18 
Delegates briefly considered “Georgia Triumvirate” of Robert Toombs, Howell 
Cobb, and Alexander Stephens as possible candidates.  None distinguished himself as a 
truly satisfying choice.  Toombs, a noted attorney and prominent U.S. senator, was the 
early favorite for the office, but he lost support when several states’ delegates tipped their 
hand regarding their preference for Jefferson Davis.  Longstanding animosities with old 
political rivals did not help his cause either.  His erratic behavior and heavy drinking 
during the opening days of the Montgomery Convention probably vanquished whatever 
prospects Toombs had for capturing the presidency.  As his lifelong friend Alexander 
Stephens noted with dismay, Toombs was “tight every day at dinner” and “about two 
days before the election” he was “tighter than I ever saw him.”19  Davis named Toombs 
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as secretary of state, a job that Toombs accepted but with which he quickly grew 
disenchanted.  He would go on to serve tumultuous stints in both the Congress and the 
Confederate Army.  Always critical of President Davis’s centralization policies, Toombs 
would eventually ally openly with Stephens, his brother Linton, and Georgia governor 
Joseph Brown.  These men would emerge as some of the most critical opponents of the 
Davis administration.20  
Some favored Howell Cobb, a short-lived prospect for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1860 and current president of the Provisional Congress.  
Curiously, the position as the Confederacy’s chief executive did not appeal to heretofore-
ambitious Cobb.  Notably quiet during his tenure as president of the interim Congress, he 
provided little more to the proceedings than his physical presence.  His lack of 
assertiveness in the new Confederacy may have been due in part to his political past as a 
political moderate who was lukewarm on secession until 1860.  Simmering distrust by 
more assertively secessionist delegates could explain his resulting reluctance to take a 
more active role in government affairs.  What is known is that he did not want the job of 
president and made no effort to seek it.  A February 6, 1861 letter to his wife provides 
ample evidence that Cobb lacked interest in the presidency.  The correspondence also 
reveals a disinclination by many provisional delegates to put forth any nominee.  Despite 
the seeming reluctance by many of the delegates to campaign actively for a candidate, 
Cobb astutely commented that “I rather think that Jeff. Davis will be the man, though I 
have not heard any one say that he is for him.  The truth is – and it is creditable to our 
public men here – there is no effort made to put forward any man, but all seem to desire 
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in everything to do what is best to be done to advance and prosper the cause of 
independence . . .” 21 
Alexander Stephens was the third prospective contender from Georgia.  He had 
ample political experience, including sixteen years as a prominent U.S. congressman.  
While a lengthy record of public service normally would have made him a highly 
attractive nominee, his record as a Unionist Whig who only recently converted to the 
secessionist cause surely diminished his prospects for the presidency.  As late as New 
Year’s Eve 1860, Stephens still privately bemoaned what he saw as his home state’s 
recalcitrance, claiming, “the truth is our ultra men do not desire any redress of . . . 
grievances.  They would really obstruct indirectly any effort to that end.  They are for 
breaking up.” The idea of secession left Stephens truly distraught.  All is now dark and 
gloomy,” he lamented, “I see no ray of hope . . . I now feel almost confident that this 
State will go for secession.  I think it unwise and have done what I could to prevent it; but 
it is beyond my control, and the movement will before it ends I fear be beyond the control 
of those who started it . . .” 22 
After Georgia seceded, the state chose Stephens as one of her ten delegates to the 
assembly in Montgomery.  He went reluctantly and accepted his seat only after he 
received assurances from other convention attendees that the conference would base the 
new Confederate constitution on the old federal document.23     
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Although Stephen’s past as a Whig and Unionist precluded his selection as 
provisional president, many delegates did deem him an excellent choice for office of 
vice-president.  Although many convention members did not agree with his politics, he 
was awarded the vice-presidency because of his potential appeal to indecisive Border 
States contemplating disunion.  His presence in the executive branch would also placate 
moderates and Unionists within current Confederate borders, giving them a sense of 
inclusion.  Additionally, Georgia was the most populous state among the original seven 
to secede.   As Emory Thomas argues, “now he was vice-president because he had been a 
cooperationist, because he was a Georgia Whig, and because his friends in the Georgia 
delegation had worked for his election.”24 The provisional Constitution did not specify 
any duties for Stephens, so he participated in the Congress like a normal member.  He 
was very active in the Constitutional committee, as well as the Rules and Executive 
Department committees.  While Stephens never had warm personal relations with 
Jefferson Davis, they did have a cordial professional relationship during the 
Confederacy’s first year, particularly during the four months that Montgomery housed the 
Confederate government. 25 
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was the only truly acceptable choice for most 
delegates in Montgomery.   Although he resolutely accepted his home state’s secession 
and swiftly resigned from his U.S. Senate seat, he had a long record as a moderate on 
secession.  A West Point graduate, Davis had a formidable political career.   His record 
included service as a U.S. representative; a stint as a colonel in the 1st Mississippi Rifles, 
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during which he distinguished himself as a bona fide war hero in the Mexican War; 
secretary of war in the Pierce administration; and finally, service as one of the preeminent 
Democratic senators in Washington.  Following his resignation from Congress, he 
returned to his plantation near Vicksburg, where he soon learned that he received a state 
commission as major general of Mississippi troops on January 25.  Inclined towards the 
military, Davis welcomed this position eagerly.   Although Davis embraced the prospect 
of commanding troops, he never had the chance to fulfill this duty.26    While at his 
plantation home Brierfield, Davis received a telegram the very day Congress elected him, 
notifying him of his new post.  “Sir”, the message read, “We are directed to inform you 
that you were this day unanimously elected President of the Provisional Government of 
the Confederate States of America, and to request you to come to Montgomery 
immediately. We send also a special messenger. Do not wait for him.”27  Davis’s wife, 
Varina, noted that the message floored Davis; she remarked that he responded to the 
telegram with a sense of grief and shock comparable to hearing of a sudden death in the 
family.  Despite his misgivings, Davis accepted his new responsibility, departing 
promptly for Montgomery.  Sworn in on February 17, 1861, Davis immediately went to 
work as the new chief executive.28 
Although the drafting and ratification of the permanent Constitution only took 
five weeks, Davis and the Montgomery Congress simply did not have time to wait for the 
final draft document.  The provisional constitution provided a sufficient temporary 
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blueprint for confronting matters of finance, diplomacy, and measures to bolster national 
defense.  Additionally, W.P. Harris of Mississippi introduced a bill in secret session on 
February 9, 1861 that resolved to continue all Union laws consistent with the 
Confederacy’s temporary foundations of government, a course of action swiftly 
adopted.29  Within this framework, Davis and the Provisional Congress scrambled to 
stabilize their makeshift nation.  
Steady and industrious activity marked the first session of the Provisional 
Congress. Facing imminent conflict with the North, Davis received authorization on 
February 20 to make war contracts.  Sensing that the nation could not arm itself in a 
timely manner, he pressed for the Confederacy to assume control of arms, munitions, 
forts, arsenals and navy yards that the Union formerly held in Southern borders on 
February 26.30 A provisional army was created on February 28; quickly on its heels came 
the establishment of a twelve-month regular army on March 9.31  The assembly retained a 
decades-old reluctance to build up a large standing army, though.  Duncan Kenner’s 
March 4 amendment to the army bill typified such sentiments, mandating “that the 
president shall call into the service of the Confederate states only so many of the troops 
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herein provided for as he may deem the safety of the Confederacy may require.”32  The 
nation initially intended for an army of 100,000 men – a number that would quickly 
prove insufficient following the firing upon Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s subsequent call 
for 75,000 militiamen on April 15.  Of course, few anticipated the size, scope, or duration 
of the war during these early days in the legislature.  
Solons acceded to requests by Christopher Memminger, the new secretary of the 
treasury, for an issue of treasury notes and bonds.   On February 28, Congress approved a 
domestic loan for fifteen million dollars and authorized the issue of one million dollars in 
treasury notes on March 8.33  Other issues occupied the Congress, such as postage and 
railroad rates, establishing bureaus regulating concerns from lighthouses to Indian affairs, 
registering ships and vessels, and prohibitions on the manufacture of liquor.  The 
establishment of a centralized judiciary branch produced strenuous debate, but no results.  
The first session adjourned on March 16 with no Supreme Court; the institution of the 
third federal branch remained elusive for the rest of the nation’s existence.34 
 The firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, and Lincoln’s subsequent call for the states 
to provide 75,000 militia troops on April 15 dominated the Provisional Congress that 
convened for a special session on April 29.  War was now a reality, requiring renewed 
efforts regarding the nation’s defenses.   Davis sent a message to the assembled 
legislature declaring, “all we ask is to be left alone.”35  His communication stressed that 
the Confederacy – which he noted as a compact of states – was always the target of 
Northern subjugation efforts, particularly from strident abolitionists.  The Union tipped 
                                                 
32JCC, I, 105. 
33JCC, I, 96, 116. 
34JCC, I, 127-129, 132-140. 
35 M&P, I, 63.  
  22
its hand concerning its aggressive intent with the shifting of troops to Fort Sumter and 
then ignoring Davis’s peace delegation recently sent to Washington, D.C.  Lincoln’s 
resulting call for 75,000 militia was nothing less than a “declaration of war.” Citing the 
deficiencies with the Confederate navy, Davis called upon Southern private vessels to 
enlist for the cause. He pressed the Congress for more defense appropriations and an 
additional 100,000 troops to counteract Lincoln’s buildup of men.  The sense of urgency 
in Davis’s message impressed even Robert Barnwell Rhett, already an open critic of the 
administration.  Rhett moved the next day for the Congress to act immediately upon “so 
much of the said message.”36 
 By May 3, Congress passed a bill recognizing the existence of war between the 
Confederacy and the United States.37 Davis signed the bill on May 6, along with a 
measure awarding letters of marque to privateer ships.38 By May 9, Davis signed a bill 
calling for additional troops – a measure that Congress passed a day earlier.  Although 
many congressmen still harbored some reluctance to grant troops terms of service longer 
than 12 months, the act allowed the Confederacy to accept into volunteer service forces 
that the chief executive deemed expedient for the duration of the war.39  Financing the 
war also occupied solons.  By May 17, Davis signed a bill authorizing $50 million in new 
loans and $20 million in treasury notes 40.  Legal precedent for centralization of the 
infrastructure came when a bill granting the executive branch control of telegraph lines 
for defensive purposes passed on May 9.41  Anti-Davis forces did little to obstruct matters 
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during the second session; one of the few open displays of opposition was a May 18 
effort by South Carolina’s Rhett, Robert Woodward Barnwell, and Thomas Jefferson 
Withers to strike out a clause granting $987.50 for executive mansion furniture.  The 
motion lost on a 8 to 1 vote.42  By the time of adjournment on May 21, Congress had 
enacted significant measures to bolster the nation’s defenses – most of which Davis 
wanted and needed. 
Hostilities at Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call for troops triggered the final wave of 
Southern secession.43  Unlike the states in the Lower South, these Upper South and 
Border States depended less on intensive plantation agriculture.  Although slavery was 
certainly prevalent in Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Missouri and 
Kentucky, levels of slave ownership in the newly admitted states did not approach the 
numbers held in the original seven states of the Confederacy.  While these states certainly 
were protective of slavery within their borders, the prospect of invading Union forces 
marching across their home soil also propelled Upper South states to act. Although the 
admission of six more states did not significantly distort voting patterns during the first 
year of the Confederacy, the increasing levels of Union conquest and disruption did 
eventually alter voting patterns in Congress.  Missouri and Kentucky never formally 
seceded, but Congress recognized rump delegations on November 28 and December 10, 
1861, respectively.  Missouri and Kentucky’s rump delegations in particular served to 
alter the balance in Congress, even though these states never formally seceded and were 
under Union control for virtually the war’s entirety.  Despite these impediments, Missouri 
and Kentucky’s congressmen were capable of casting the deciding vote on controversial 
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measures - in spite of the fact that they probably would be subject to limited enforcement 
at best in their home states.  The longer the war lasted, Confederate states that came 
under Union control sent delegations that were often Davis’s most ardent supporters; 
after all, they wanted and needed a centralized war effort to reestablish a Confederate 
foothold in their native land.44 
By the time Congress convened on July 20 for its third provisional session, the 
seat of government had relocated to Richmond, Virginia.   Davis arrived in Richmond on 
May 29 to congratulatory crowds.   Several reasons prompted the shift.  Facilities and 
amenities in Montgomery proved to be woefully inadequate; politicians and citizens alike 
lamented the city’s inability to handle the crush of delegates, dependents, press, and 
patronage seekers.  A much larger city, replete with major railroad hubs, banks, and the 
invaluable Tredegar ironworks, which became the Confederacy’s leading munitions 
producer, Richmond was a logical choice for the new capital.45 Relocating the nation’s 
first city placed it within 100 miles of Washington, D.C., a perceptive strategic move.  It 
would have to be defended and doing so served to place pressure on the Union’s capital. 
More than a few skirmishes and battles occurred since Sumter, including Big 
Bethel, Virginia and a heated series of conflicts in Missouri.  Both sides anticipated a 
major conflict in the East, a battle that both sides prayed would be decisive.  Impending 
conflict between sizeable Union and Confederate forces loomed when Davis sent his 
opening message to Congress on July 20.  The president blasted what he deemed as 
deceitful activity by the Union: 
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The rapid progress of events for the last few weeks has fully sufficed to strip the veil behind which 
the true policy and purposes of the Government of the United States had been previously 
concealed; their odious features now stand fully revealed; the message of their President and the 
action of their Congress during the present month, confess the intention of subjugating these States 
by a war, whose folly is equaled by its wickedness; a war by which it is impossible to attain the 
proposed result, whilst its dire calamities, not to be avoided by us, will fall with double severity on 
themselves.46 
Davis cited Lincoln’s calls for half a million troops and $400 million in military 
appropriations as indications that the Union sought to conquer the South.  He then 
attacked alleged Union abuses of Confederate prisoners of war and threatened to 
reciprocate against Union prisoners if cruelties did not cease.47  Davis also assailed 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Border States, citing it as a gross 
abuse of civil liberty.  Little did Davis realize that he soon would request similar 
measures himself in order to stabilize chaotic regions of the Confederacy.48 Davis also 
requested additional troops in order to offset Lincoln’s increases in arms, citing that “a 
corresponding increase in our forces will become necessary. The recommendations for 
the raising and efficient equipment of this additional force will be contained in the 
communication of the Secretary of War, to which I need scarcely invite your earnest 
attention.”49           
 Congress went to work as the guns at Manassas roared in the distance.  News of a 
Confederate victory led to wild exultations. Staggering numbers of wounded troops 
streaming back into the city after the battle quickly abated Richmond’s initial outbursts of 
joy.  Seemingly, every empty space in Richmond became a makeshift hospital.50  
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Congress realized that the war would now be a long and bloody one and quickly moved 
to safeguard against the possibilities of sensitive material leaking to the enemy.  On July 
26, a resolution passed directing Howell Cobb, president of the Congress, to order secret 
sessions after the each day’s preliminary reading of the legislative journal, despite his 
brother T.R.R. Cobb’s protestations against legislation protecting secret sessions.51  
 The third session had five weeks of frenzied activity.  Congressional 
representatives diligently labored to increase the size of the army, pondered the 
resumption of slave importation, and enacted new means for funding the war effort.   On 
August 8, Davis signed laws authorizing the raising of volunteer troops in the border 
states of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware; another gave permission for the 
deportation of enemy aliens; and “an act further to provide for the public defense” was 
also enacted.52 After considerable debate, Congress implemented a war tax, including a 
rather high 15 percent tariff that stayed in place for the duration of the war.  Although 
delegates realized such measures might prove to be unpopular, they passed the levies 
unanimously.53  On August 19, Davis approved a $100 million produce loan bill, passed 
in hopes of providing additional funding for the war effort.54   
 Davis enjoyed a considerable degree of legislative success during the 
Confederacy’s first year.  The Provisional Congress approved all of his cabinet 
nominees.55 Nominated to head the Navy Department, only Stephen R. Mallory of 
Florida encountered significant delay.  His initial nomination was referred to the 
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Committee on Naval Affairs on February 25.56  His political past as a cooperationist and 
his alleged personal past as “a rake” led to a reluctance by some congressmen to confirm 
him.  In fact, the delegations from both Texas and Florida, his home state, voted against 
his confirmation.57  Congress eventually confirmed him on March 4.58   
 Other political appointees enjoyed swift confirmation during the Confederacy’s 
first year.  Unanimous consent came for all of Davis’s nominations for district court 
judgeships on March 16 and again on May 9, 1861, the last day of meeting for the 
Provisional Congress’s first session.59  Congress did not often contest the commander 
chief of the army, especially during the first year. The president’s choices for military 
appointments generally had smooth and swift passage.  Rejections seldom occurred; a 
notable example being the denial of D.H. Todd as a lieutenant in the infantry because he 
was “Lincoln’s brother-in-law.”60  Even when presented with controversial military 
appointees, Congress normally agreed with Davis’s choices.  An exception was the 
contentious confirmation process for George Bibb Crittenden of Kentucky, whose brother 
Thomas served as a general in the Union army.  Although a military court of inquiry 
ruled Crittenden guilty of drunkenness during the Battle of Mill Springs (and innocent of 
harboring Union sympathies, despite his family connections), Congress confirmed the 
Kentuckian to the rank of major general by a vote of 25-19 on February 17, 1862.61
 General goodwill between Davis and the Provisional Congress did not mean that 
Davis was unwilling to exercise his power to veto legislation.  He returned twelve bills to 
                                                 
56JCC, I, 85. 
57 Rable, The Confederate Republic, 72. 
58JCC, I, 105-106. 
59JCC, I, 153, 204. 
60JCC, I, 840. 
61JCC, I, 846; James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine, 1988), 297, 305. 
  28
the Provisional Congress; within a single year, Davis’s veto totals eclipsed the number of 
executive rejections issued by any prior American president.   Vetoes came on such 
matters as the slave trade, the establishment of additional jurisdictions along the 
Mississippi River, and military furloughs.  Most of the vetoes centered on improper 
wording or legal inconsistencies; as a stringent constitutionalist, Davis would not permit 
the legislature to make the slightest deviations from their legal charter.  Other vetoes 
simply responded to the Congress’s carelessness.  Davis vetoed the initial bill allowing 
the seat of government to change its location to Richmond because Congress forgot to 
include the executive branch’s transfer in the initial bill.  Pragmatism guided vetoes on 
various munitions and furlough bills.  The president often cited redundancies, potential 
for abuse, or inevitable logistical logjams.  No serious efforts to override any of Davis’s 
vetoes materialized during the first year of government.  Congress removed the 
constitutionally offensive passages or watched feeble efforts to counteract his wishes die 
on the floor.62         
 National elections for the executive and First Congress took place on November 
7, 1861.  The results produced smashing victories for Davis and his supporters and offer 
ample proof that the Confederate electorate strongly endorsed the continuance of his 
policies.  The army enjoyed success in the field; relations between Davis and his 
Congress still were harmonious; and the Confederate government demanded minimal 
sacrifice from the citizenry, hoping that the early spirit of volunteerism would sustain 
itself.  Davis and Stephens faced no challenges to their respective offices and did not 
have to campaign to retain their seats. The interim executives ran on a single ticket and 
won an uncontested race. The inauguration took place on February 22, 1862 for their 
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constitutionally mandated single, six-year terms.63       
 The congressional elections also had minimal campaigning; most candidates 
simply announced their intentions to seek office through announcements in their local 
newspapers. Beyond that, little electioneering took place.  Lingering enmity towards 
political parties remained, thus many candidates jettisoned references regarding former 
political allegiances in favor of messages for Confederate unity.  Old party divisions 
could and did affect some local elections; conflict arose primarily over a candidate’s 
stance on secession or cooperation with the U.S.  Excluding the occasional squabble 
regarding one’s former position on secession or cooperation, most elections were 
colorless affairs.  Many elections went uncontested, particularly those in which soldiers 
(enlisted or commissioned) ran.  There was little open criticism of Confederate policies 
by candidates and there was little coverage to campaigns and elections by the press.64
 Comparisons between the membership in the Provisional and First Congresses 
show a sizeable loss in seats for ex-Whigs. Voters in the November 1861 elections chose 
35 former Whigs, ten fewer than in the Provisional Congress.  Past Democrats had a 
slight increase in numbers, from 62 in the Provisional Congress to 64 in the popularly 
elected First Congress.  Congressional representatives with unknown or undeclared party 
histories increased from 10 seats in the Provisional Congress to 13 in the First Congress.  
Significant changes in the Congress did occur if totals are analyzed by candidates’ 
secession stance – Secessionists expanded from 58 to 64, Unionists or cooperationists 
diminished from 45 to 34, unknowns or undeclared grew from 13 to 18.  If nothing else, 
these shifts indicate it behooved a candidate to remain silent on the issue – even if they 
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opposed secession - if they hoped for a realistic chance to retain or win office. The 1861 
election totals indicate that voters retained considerable support for the war effort and 
Jefferson Davis’s policies.65        
 Davis quickly became a polarizing figure for the Richmond press, particularly in 
the wake of the First Battle of Manassas.  General Joseph E. Johnston, General P.G.T. 
Beauregard, and Davis became mired in considerable controversy regarding what should 
have been the proper course of action following the Union army’s retreat.  None handled 
the others’ criticisms diplomatically, and the ensuing debates among the men spilled into 
the public forum.  The local press pounced on the increasingly acrimonious conflict. The 
Richmond Examiner became a strident critic of the Davis administration – only Rhett’s 
Charleston Mercury rivaled the Examiner’s dislike for Davis.  Founded in 1847 by the 
mercurial John Moncure Daniel, the Examiner had long been an ardent advocate of 
secession and states’ rights.  One of the Examiner’s leading rivals, the Whig converted 
from the paper least sympathetic to secession and the Confederacy to a fervent supporter 
to the cause, even though the paper became a harsh Davis critic in the process.  Both the 
Dispatch and Enquirer generally supported the president.  Davis was often far too busy to 
trouble himself with the often-hostile assessments of the local press. After all, he did not 
have to worry about standing for reelection after November 1861.   Maintaining the 
support of the press was essential for his pursuit in implementing preferred domestic 
policies and plans for defense however.  Congressional representatives, who did have to 
consider the influence the printed media held on their constituency, were incredibly 
mindful of the press and often expressed on the floor their concerns regarding journalistic 
                                                 
65 Alexander and Beringer, Anatomy, 36. 
 
  31
disapproval.  The displeasure expressed by members in open session was infrequent from 
February 1861 to February 1862.   Increased demands for public sacrifice after February 
1862 - combined with military setbacks – would give way to increasingly numerous 
public vexations by lawmakers as the war dragged on.66    
 The fifth and final session of the Provisional Congress assembled in Richmond on 
November 18, 1861 and adjourned on February 17, 1862.67  A series of setbacks plagued 
the assembly.  Policymakers convened in the midst of heightened international tensions.  
On November 8, the USS San Jacinto seized Confederate diplomats James Mason and 
John Slidell while they were aboard the Trent, a British cutter en route to Great Britain.  
British officials were outraged; the next six weeks proved to be the closest that England 
came to going to war against the Union.  Lincoln decided to free the captured envoys, 
however, and the two envoys resumed their eastern voyage on January 1, 1862 and 
arrived at Southampton on January 29.68        
 More misfortune plagued the fifth session.  The winter months also included 
Georgia and South Carolina weathering a rash of fires along their respective coastline 
after local planters decided to raze their stockpiles of cotton rather than face possible 
seizure by lurking Union forces.  Ex-president John Tyler, now a congressional 
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representative in Richmond, died on January 18, 1862 and the government ceased 
operations on January 21 in order to mourn him.69  Military disasters at Fort Henry, 
Roanoke Island, and Fort Donelson occurred within a week and a half in February 1862.  
In a fit of desperation, the Committee on Military Affairs on February 10 resolved to 
investigate the use of “pikes, lances, or spears and shotguns” as methods of armament.70 
Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin became a convenient scapegoat for recent military 
setbacks and calls for his ouster from the War Department grew thunderous.  
 Hesitant to supersede the electorate’s mandate in November, the lame duck 
Provisional Congress often balked at implementing major policy changes until the first 
regularly elected Congress convened on February 18, 1862.  One exception to this 
general practice was the matter of maintaining the size and strength of the Confederate 
army.  Most troops enlisted for only one year, envisioning a short and bloodless war.  
These terms of enlistment were now ending as the fifth session convened, forcing 
Congress to formulate measures to keep the army intact.  On December 2, 1861, 
Congress began debating methods to encourage additional volunteers and re-enlistment.   
By January 23, 1862, Davis signed a congressional bill allowing him to accept re-
enlistments and new volunteers for two or three years of service.  In hopes of inducing 
large numbers of volunteers, the act also gave men a $ 50 bounty and 60 days of leave. 
Davis also vetoed a bill “granting furloughs in certain cases” on February 3, 1862.  
Although he stressed his primary objection to the measure was the impracticality of 
“administer[ing] an army in the field by statute,” the president did acknowledge concerns 
that were more prosaic.  The furlough proposal, if enacted, would have placed up to five 
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per cent of all troops on leave simultaneously, producing a massive strain on Confederate 
railroads that were already overwhelmed with freight demands.  Most importantly, the 
terms of many twelve-month Confederate volunteers were about to expire.  The rush to 
volunteer for combat slowed to a trickle by winter 1862, and the commander in chief 
simply could not afford to send men home who may not return to the front lines.  The 
Provisional Congress was surprisingly contentious with the president and came very 
close to overriding Davis’s veto.  The final vote to overturn Davis’s decision resulted in 
eight yays, three nays, and two undecided votes – one vote shy of reversing the veto.71  
 Still reluctant to ask the Confederate citizenry for additional contributions, 
Congress did what it could to keep the army solvent with forceful exhortations for 
volunteer service.  The burden of requiring further sacrifice from the people would fall on 
the First Congress’s shoulders, which would face the necessity to tackle legislation on 
impressments and conscription.  It was in this troubling environment that the Provisional 
Congress adjourned for the last time on February 17, 1862, exactly one year after Davis’s 
inauguration as provisional president.  Although the Provisional Congress ended during a 
tumultuous period, no one could envision the troubling times that awaited the Davis and 
the First Congress.   
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CHAPTER II 
FILLING THE RANKS AND IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW: 
CONFLICTS OVER CONSCRIPTION LEGISLATION AND SUSPENDING THE 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
 
The Confederate government was a makeshift body always plagued with a 
multitude of logistical problems, particularly during its first year of existence.  In order to 
field an army large enough to thwart Union invasion, the Provisional Congress in 
Montgomery had no choice but to rely on the states to provide men, munitions, and 
armaments.  Given the improvisational nature that guided the formation of defensive 
measures, along with the varying amount of resources available in each state, it is not 
surprising that states had difficulties coordinating efforts with one another and with the 
central government.  
The Provisional Congress’s initial measures for national defense showed that few 
envisioned a long or extensive conflict.  Both the provisional and permanent constitutions 
gave Davis as commander in chief control of all military operations.  Although Davis 
realized that mobilization of troops on the national scale was essential in order to provide 
adequate defenses, he realized that the Congress had to grapple with the formation of a 
new federal government and bureaucracy.  Therefore, he did not press for greater 
executive control of manpower and allowed the states to enroll and muster men for 
protection.  First Manassas and Lincoln’s requisition of 75,000 troops from the states 
changed everything, however.  Legislation passed on May 8 and May 11 removed limits 
on the number of volunteers the Confederacy could receive and allowed men to submit 
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their services for the duration of the war.  By July 21, Davis advocated a measure 
allowing the Confederate government to receive 400,000 volunteers.  The preliminary 
deluge of volunteers overwhelmed both state and national authorities.  Many men found 
themselves turned away because the War Department could not supply or arm all of 
them.1 
The First Congress convened for its initial session on February 18, 1862 mindful 
of an impending crisis within Confederate ranks.  Expecting a short, glorious, and largely 
bloodless conflict, the bulk of the army consisted of volunteers who enlisted for twelve 
months of service in the spring of 1861, an obligation most considered too long.  
Jefferson Davis commented on this general sentiment in his February 25, 1862 
congressional message noting, “When the war first broke out many of our people could 
with difficulty be persuaded that it would be long or serious.  It was not deemed possible 
that anything so insane as a persistent attempt to subjugate these States could be made, 
still less that the delusion would so prevail as to give to the war the vast proportions 
which it has assumed.”2   
By fall 1861, however, Confederate participants came to realize that the war 
would be much longer and more arduous than anticipated.  Often unhealthy and 
dispiriting, camp life quickly lost its luster.  The enemy quickly proved far more resilient 
than initially expected and the initial flush of war fever quickly abated.  Scores of men 
initially hesitant to enlist in the military now balked at the prospect. Even men more 
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hawkish in temperament now shrank back.  As Albert Burton Moore noted in 
Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy, once the original wave of enthusiasm died 
down, a large number “of these ‘do or die’ patriots were to be found later in the ranks of 
the so-called ‘stay at home gentry.’”3  George Rable comments in his book Civil Wars 
that “many women had sent their men off to fight in an outburst of patriotic zeal, but 
defeats and mounting casualties soon slaked their enthusiasm.”  Even before the first 
conscript law took effect, “thousands scrambled to get their men discharged or detailed; 
others worked just as assiduously to arrange for substitutes, transfers, or furloughs.”4  In 
addition to less than ideal conditions in the field, news of hardship on the home front 
made many troops in the ranks eager to return home.  With the infant nation’s survival 
hanging in the balance, the country’s defenses could not long survive without a new 
influx of men to counter ever-growing Union forces.  Retaining the army’s seasoned 
combat veterans in the meantime was equally essential, if not more so.   
 Mindful of long-held Southern fears of an intrusive central authority, Jefferson 
Davis and the Confederate Congress desperately wanted to maintain the spirit of 
volunteerism when addressing problems with the army’s numbers.  The fifth session of 
the Provisional Congress yielded several measures designed to persuade re-enlistment 
from men already in the ranks.  Congress also hoped these bills would bolster the ranks 
by enticing men who had yet to take arms.  A December 11, 1861 act offered incentives 
such as $50.00  bounties and 60 days leave in exchange for two or three year 
commitments.  The law did not yield the large numbers of re-enlistments and new 
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volunteers that Davis and Congress expected. An unintended consequence of the law, 
however, was massive numbers of men who did sign up proceeded to clog up the 
railroads as they went home on furlough for Christmas.  More than a few men, weary of 
war and homesick, would never return from their holiday.  It quickly became apparent to 
Davis that merely enticing men to enlist voluntarily would neither fill the ranks to 
satisfactory numbers nor induce many combat veterans, who fretted about their homes 
and communities, to stay in the army once they completed their obligated year of 
service.5 
 In order to maintain the soon-to-be discharged twelve-month volunteers and 
close the quickly widening gap in manpower between North and South, Davis pressed for 
a military draft in his introductory message to the first session of the First Congress.  
“The policy of enlistment for short terms, against which I have steadily contended from 
the commencement of the war, has, in my judgment, contributed in no immaterial degree 
to the recent reverses which we have suffered, and even now renders it difficult to furnish 
you an accurate statement of the Army,” he wrote.  Mindful that most of the Confederate 
population had been “incredulous of a long war” and “naturally averse to long 
enlistments”, Davis and the Provisional Congress could not ask for long-term 
commitments.  Composed mostly of unelected officials, the Provisional Congress 
hesitated to enact bold measures.  The ephemeral nature of that legislature, fearful that it 
did not always act by popular mandate, “rendered it impracticable to obtain volunteers for 
a greater period than twelve months.”  The November 1861 elections, however, were 
smashing victories both for Davis and for his supporters – an emphatic indication that the 
people approved of Davis’s efforts to ensure national survival.  
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By now, all recognized that the war would be a long and bloody one.  Maintaining 
troops already in the field and compelling those on leave to return to camp was the first 
priority.  Davis acknowledged twelve-month volunteers were “generally reenlisting” but 
often “compelled in many instances to go home to make the necessary arrangements for 
their families during their prolonged absence.”  Consequently, he noted, “it is 
exceedingly difficult to give an accurate statement of the number of our forces in the 
field.”  Large numbers of soldiers on leave and new volunteers in transit left many units 
with woefully low numbers.  But “this evil,” which Davis “had foreseen and was 
powerless to prevent, may now be said to be substantially at an end, and . . . we shall not 
again during the war be exposed to seeing our strength diminished by this fruitful cause 
of disaster short enlistments.”  Although Davis did not explicitly ask for a conscript law 
in the message, his attack on the current system wholly composed of volunteers made the 
implications in his message obvious.6   
 Members of both houses quickly went to work satisfying Davis’s demands.  On 
February 26, the day after receiving the executive message, the Confederate House of 
Representatives began debate on the various occupations to be exempted from the 
national draft.  James Lyons of Virginia, who would become one of Davis’s most trusted 
friends in Richmond, attacked the potential exemptions offered.  He noted that a glut of 
minor civil officials proposed, particularly deputy postmasters – a common patronage 
position in the antebellum era.  Despite his former prominence in the Virginia 
Democratic party, Lyons would establish himself as one of the foremost proponents for 
centralized defense and taxation.  He was one of the first congressmen offering criticism 
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of the exemption clause, noting that “this law not only exempts postmasters, but their 
deputies, and we ought not to lose many a good soldier in consequence of such a law.”7 
 While there is ample documentation of the exemption debates, evidence of the 
debate on the actual conscript bill is limited.  Mindful of compromising the nature of 
deliberations, both the House and Senate confined discussion of conscription to secret 
sessions.8  Discussions on draft exemptions did take place in open session, however.  The 
public knew of a large number of potential exclusions by March 12.  By this point, the 
House agreed to bar members from the Confederate Congress, along with their assistants 
“and the regular clerks belonging to the same;” Confederate judges, marshals, and their 
clerks; Confederate congressmen; customs officials; “all persons actually employed in the 
conveyance of the mail;” river pilots and “all mariners actually employed in the sea 
service of any citizen or merchant within the Confederate States;” and all men exempted 
by state law.9 
The House spent the remainder of the day debating additional possible 
occupations that it might exclude from the forthcoming draft.  Lengthy discussions 
ensued on the conscription of postmasters and their assistants, as well as those employed 
in ironworks and mining.  The next day witnessed continued debate on excluding all men 
engaged in iron, lead, copper, and zinc production, along with other industries such as 
telegraph companies and textiles. Long and tedious deliberations on exclusions typified 
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conscription discussions.  Most congressmen wanted to exercise the utmost caution as 
they decided between the men liable for military service and those judged indispensable 
in the public and private sectors.  Slow and steady consideration of the matter provided 
little comfort to the public and the press, who wanted a swift resolution to the matter.  
When the House temporarily ceased debate of the conscript law on March 14 to assess a 
measure amending their pay and additional compensation for mileage, harsh reaction 
followed.  The Richmond Dispatch grumbled “It is a little unfortunate, we think, that 
members should, at this period of the session, and in this hour of the country’s peril, 
devote themselves to legislation pertaining to their own comfort and convenience, rather 
than the mighty issues, which, to an outsider, seem to demand their consideration.”10 
 By late March, Davis pushed the House for action.  After receiving a message 
from Robert E. Lee approving of the conscript system, he sent a message to Congress 
requesting a streamlined and standardized conscript system for men between the ages of 
18 to 35.  Citing an “embarrassment from conflict between State and Confederate 
legislation,” Davis urged for a law satisfactory to national and state governments alike.  
Careful not to anger state officials and their citizens, he stated that Union aggression had 
“animated the people with a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute, and so self-
sacrificing that it requires rather to be regulated than to be stimulated.”  Nevertheless, he 
asserted bold and authoritative measures were urgently needed, possibly even repealing 
all military manpower laws currently on the books.  “I, therefore, recommend the passage 
of a law declaring that all persons residing within the Confederate States, between the 
ages of 18 and 35 years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to be in the 
military service of the Confederate States, and that some plain and simple method be 
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adopted for their prompt enrollment and organization, repealing all of the legislation 
heretofore enacted which would conflict with the system proposed.”11   
 Debate commenced over the stringency of Davis’s proposal.  In the Senate, 
Edward Sparrow of Louisiana and John Bullock Clark of Missouri both lauded Davis’s 
measure.  Williamson Oldham of Texas disapproved of the message, arguing Congress 
could only get state approval before forcing citizens into the army.  “This was not 
circumlocution,” he argued, “it was the theory of our government.”  He professed his 
utter confidence in the nation’s ability to vanquish Northern incursion and stressed, “. . . 
we can accomplish our deliverance without violating the fundamental law.  We have 
always been able to get more volunteers than we could arm.”  Louis T. Wigfall, his 
fellow senator from Texas, offered a conflicting assessment.  “Cease this child’s play,” he 
cried.  “The enemy are in some portions of almost every State in the Confederacy . . . We 
need a large army.  How are you going to get it?”  Conscription, he insisted, was the only 
way to fill the ranks because the citizenry “will not volunteer to fill up the old 
regiments.”  There was simply no time to talk “about the justice of our cause, the favour 
of Providence, or the aid of foreign nations.  We must have heavy battalions.”  Oldham 
then countered that he did not approve of state or national measures to conscript men into 
military service.  He believed most proposed measures violated civil liberties.  “Did 
Washington ever propose to convert this country into one great camp?”, he protested.12  
 Following the initial open debate offered in the upper house regarding the 
conscript bill, senators confined dialogue on the matter to secret sessions.  The recorded 
debate in the House prior to the passage of the draft law was considerably less 
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contentious, with a few publicly recorded comments and measures.  Charles Wells 
Russell’s quipped on March 29 that Davis merely wished to abolish state militias.  
Speaker of the House Thomas Bocock at once ruled Russell’s comments out of order.  
Russell’s early skepticism quickly abated – he would eventually emerge as one of 
Davis’s strongest supporters on centralization policies and habeas.  On March 31, Henry 
Marshall of Louisiana, whose extreme states’ rights advocacy ran counter to the 
remainder of his colleagues from his home state, offered a resolution that the House 
quickly adopted, extending the terms of service for twelve-month men for 90 days until a 
conscript act could be solidified.  Tennessean Henry S. Foote, who emerged as a 
cantankerous opponent to Davis, would offer similar measures on April 5 and April 14 in 
hopes of delaying passage of the conscript bill.  The former intended to make 
congressmen subject to service between sessions, and the latter demanded that nothing in 
the law to interfere with “the separate state sovereignty.”13 
  The first conscript act - signed into law by Davis on April 17, 1862 - solved the 
most pressing problem for national defense.  The men already in the army had their 
enlistments extended for three additional years or war’s end.  Additionally, all men 
between the ages of 18 and 35 were required to register for similar terms of service.  The 
incentives: The old enticement of a $50.00 bounty remained for men who volunteered for 
service before May 15, 1862.  If men reported for service by the deadline, the law offered 
volunteers the privilege of forming their own combat units or reorganizing old ones in 
order to serve with friends, family, and citizens from their home state.  Additionally, the 
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law permitted men who willfully volunteered to elect their own company, battalion, and 
regimental officers.   
Men who did not volunteer by the May 15 deadline lost these privileges.  Those 
conscripted lost access to the $50.00 bounty.  They also faced the very real possibility of 
placement in combat units not from their home states and without any known 
companions.  Additionally, conscript status denied men the right to vote for the officers 
who led them in the field.  In addition, they faced the very real possibility of ostracism 
from those who mattered most.  Fellow troops in the field generally viewed conscripts 
with scorn, believing their commitment to country and cause suspect.  The citizenry at 
home could and did regard conscripted men as slackers who attempted to shirk their 
duties, but they were just as likely (if not more so) to perceive conscripted men as the 
hapless victims of increasingly distant and unfeeling Richmond bureaucrats.  Such 
antipathy was especially prevalent in disaffected regions of the Confederacy, particularly 
Appalachia.14 
Many draft-eligible men who did not rush to volunteer were indeed patriots, but 
personal hardships often prevented them from appearing for service before May 15.  
Financial difficulties at home forced many men to wait until the last minute to volunteer.  
Others remained with their families until forced into the ranks.  The mounting costs of 
living and increasing shortages of basic goods made many husbands and fathers hesitant 
to leave their loved ones.  The $11.00 a month salary for privates quickly proved to be an 
inadequate means of support for a family trying to survive in an inflation-plagued market.  
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Young adult men in the civilian community became increasingly scarce, especially in 
more remote rural communities.  As the demands for men multiplied, the few remaining 
behind did not want to abandon their roles as breadwinners and protectors of their 
families and communities.  Some also perceived the reliance on a military draft as a sign 
of panic by Richmond lawmakers.  As Bell Wiley notes in The Life of Johnny Reb, many 
“saw in forced exemption an admission of despair on the part of government 
authorities.”15 
Of course, not all white Confederate males between the ages of 18 and 35 joined 
the army.  On April 12 in the Senate, William Lowndes Yancey introduced the exemption 
bill that became law nine days later.  The Senate made very few changes to Yancey’s 
draft, with the only proposed House amendment of consequence exempted all men 
already exempted by state law.  This modification never came to fruition, dying in 
committee.  The law excluded all physically and mentally handicapped men.  It also 
granted protections to government officials and various bureaucrats, exempting 
executives, judges, and their clerks on the state and national level as well as Confederate 
and state legislators.  Those laboring in industries vital to civilians and soldiers also had 
blanket protection, including men involved in communications and transportation 
industries, the clergy, men employed in ironworks, teachers, textile workers, druggists, 
and apothecaries.  Most men exempted under the law were honest and qualified men, but 
there were many who made abrupt career changes and sought refuge in “bomb-proof” 
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occupations.  Some rural areas had several teachers, druggists, and ministers appear in 
their communities seemingly overnight.16  
The conscript law also upheld the practice of substitution, a tradition dating back 
to the American Revolution.  Draft-eligible men could pay exemption fees or employ 
men who were not eligible for conscription to serve in their stead.  The policy’s objective 
was to preserve men in vital industries; as May Spencer Ringold notes, states encouraged 
the practice to “maintain as nearly as possible business as usual under war-time 
conditions.”17  By April 1862, when the Confederate Congress and Davis adopted the 
conscription act, the policy was thoroughly entrenched in southern states and Congress 
was reluctant to abolish it.  By this point, substitution, originally intended to preserve 
much needed industrialists and professionals, was predominantly a means for wealthy 
men to avoid service.  Various governors, Joseph E. Brown in particular, began enrolling 
men in state militias or declaring thousands of men state employees to keep them out of 
action.  The cost for providing a substitute was always high; eventually it became 
exorbitant.  The price went from $300 in early 1861 to several thousand dollars by the 
time Congress abolished the policy on January 9, 1864.  Until legislation forced 
principals to enlist for service by July 2, 1864, the armies lost access to tens of thousands 
of men who stayed home by merely paying a fee.18 
The first session of the First Congress adjourned on April 21, 1862, only four 
days after the passage of the conscript law.  The final day of business also happened to be 
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the same day Jefferson Davis signed a law granting him the power to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus.19  Many solons returned to their home districts to assess their constituents’ 
attitudes and to explain the necessity of passing legislation on conscription and martial 
law.  They also had the opportunity to witness the renewed waves of volunteering and the 
first batches of compulsory enlistments.  News spread of disaffection in the Confederacy 
following the passage of the first draft law.  Some rushed to enlist in partisan ranger 
service, realizing that action in these units would be limited.  While many citizens 
expressing discontent were simply dissatisfied with the government’s policies and looked 
to extralegal means of protest in order to enact constructive change, others were ardently 
Unionist.  Not only did concerns about possible insurrection concern the executive, but 
also the very real threat presented by McClellan’s advances on Richmond and Union 
disruptions in other regions forced Davis to request Congress for permission to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus in areas that he deemed it militarily expedient.20 
Unlike Lincoln, who swiftly suspended the writ in order to keep the border states 
in the Union and to keep information concerning the Federal army from the enemy, Davis 
was far more judicious in his power to declare martial law within Confederate borders.  
Earlier denunciations of Lincoln’s policies now served as a political millstone for the 
Confederate president.  At the moment, however, necessity dictated that Davis suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus in disrupted and Unionist regions.  Still, Davis feared public 
opinion viewing him as the same type of despot that he accused Lincoln of being.  He 
therefore would never suspend the writ of habeas corpus without legislative consent.21 
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The absence of a Supreme Court compounded Davis’s legal difficulties.  
Although Article 3 of the Confederate Constitution and the March 16, 1861 Judiciary Act 
both provided for its establishment, the court never materialized.  The March 16 law 
provided for annual sessions in Richmond; it also dictated that the judges presiding over 
Confederate districts would act as the Supreme Court.  A simple majority of the panel in 
Richmond would form a quorum.22  Shortly after the law took effect, however, both the 
Provisional Congress and Davis realized that the geographical expanse of the nation and 
actual and potential disruptions by Union forces made the scheduled first meeting in 
January 1862 highly unlikely.  Equally distressing was the very real possibility that 
logistics and warfare might prevent judges from returning to their home districts after 
arriving in Richmond.  Consequently, Davis signed a July 31, 1861 law that postponed 
sessions until further notice.23 
Davis and the regularly elected First Congress certainly harbored no intentions of 
preventing the organization of the government’s third branch.  Nevertheless, legislators 
devoted their efforts towards addressing more immediate matters, primarily staffing the 
army and financing the war effort.  The House and Senate struggled with the matter in 
March and April 1862; both failed to produce legislation that resulted in the institution of 
the Supreme Court.  The House killed its bill before it ever came out of committee and 
the Senate tabled its own legislation, which streamlined the makeup of the court by 
providing a chief justice and three associates instead of the more cumbersome 
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assemblage of Confederate district judges.  The second session of the First Congress saw 
the Senate resume discussion on the court but once again, the solons tabled it.  By 1863, 
declining Confederate fortunes produced increasingly vocal opponents willing to debate 
the establishment of the court.   
Opposition often came couched in platitudes defending the legal sovereignty of 
states.  Others fretted over Davis’s potential nominees for the federal posts.  The enmity 
between the leading advocate of the Supreme Court and its foremost opponent also 
crippled progress.  Senate Judiciary Committee chair Benjamin Hill, one of Davis’s 
closest allies, sponsored the bill establishing the court.  William Lowndes Yancey, by 
now one of Davis’s most strident critics, opposed it.  Antagonism between the two men 
escalated to the point of physical confrontation.  One particularly heated debate between 
the two degenerated into an exchange of insults.  Yancey called Hill a man devoid of 
ideas, much like a fox without a tail.  Complaining that Hill “attacks and portrays my 
intellect,” Yancey then proceeded to offer a portrait of his own, referring to Hill and 
Louis T. Wigfall as “Thimble Nigger and Little Joker.”  Hill then retorted that any time 
Yancey opened his mouth “words rush out like shot from his bag.”  Hill then threw an 
inkstand at Yancey; the volley struck him on the cheek and drew blood.  Either stunned 
or dismissively arrogant, Yancey ignored the attack and remained seated at his desk.  The 
indifference shown by Yancey further enraged Hill, who grabbed a chair and tried to 
charge Yancey before other members on the Senate floor halted and disarmed him.   
Although the Supreme Court never materialized, there were no serious legitimate 
threats to the conscript laws.  State courts struck down every legal challenge posed, 
upholding the legality of the draft.  On the other hand, state courts did present 
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considerable resistance to the suspension of habeas corpus, particularly when they judged 
that army officers were excessive in their administration of the law and when they 
applied it in an extralegal manner.  Most notably, Georgia and North Carolina benches 
provided substantial defiance.24 
Debate on conscription began anew when the second session of the First Congress 
convened on August 18, 1862.  President Davis demanded revisions to the initial 
statute.25  In his opening message to the Congress, Davis noted, “The acts passed at your 
last session intended to secure the public defense by general enrollment, and to render 
uniform the rules governing troops in the service, have led to some unexpected criticism 
that is much to be regretted.”  The president had confidence that the Congress could 
correct difficulties between states and the Confederate government.  “You can best devise 
the means for establishing that entire cooperation of the State and Confederate 
governments which is essential to the well-being of both at all times, but which is now 
indispensable to their very existence,” he wrote.  “And if any legislation shall seem to 
you appropriate for adjusting differences of opinion, it will be my pleasure as well as 
duty to cooperate in any measure that may be devised for reconciling a just care for the 
public defense with a proper deference for the most scrupulous susceptibilities of the 
State authorities.”26 
Grumblings from local constituents and state governments, a still appreciable 
shortage in manpower, and military setbacks at Shiloh, New Orleans, and Memphis 
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compelled Congress to act.  Even Foote appeared surprisingly conciliatory as the second 
session convened.  Acknowledging his past animosities with Davis, he stated that he was 
now “hand and heart with him” as he proffered a resolution calling for 250,000 additional 
troops on August 19.  By August 22, however, he was back to his old tricks as he offered 
a longwinded attack on any extension of conscription and went as far as alleging that 
Davis and Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin saw no need to expand the law.  
Congressman Robert Woodward Barnwell, who was much more moderate and supportive 
of Davis than his colleagues from South Carolina, offered two nationalistic measures on 
August 21.  He proposed that all men between 18 and 35 declared eligible for 
conscription; that those men not yet enrolled be immediately registered, regardless of 
what municipality or state they were located; and labeling anyone avoiding service 
without governmental permission a deserter.  He also suggested abolishing the partisan 
ranger service.  While few members of Congress were unwilling to take such drastic 
measures, most showed an eagerness to modify current laws.  By September 27, the draft 
age went up from 35 to 45.  On October 9, Congress established the means to provide a 
uniform process of military training by instituting standardized camps of instruction and 
drill officers to administer them.  An October 11 law allowed for the encouragement of 
volunteers from Missouri and Kentucky, two states represented in the Confederate 
Congress, even though they never formally seceded and remained outside of the authority 
of the conscript law.27 
Despite these implementations to improve the process of receiving men and 
training them, the second conscript act - which Davis signed on October 11 - did not 
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provide the expanded pool of men that the nation needed for defense.  Although the law 
allowed for the raise in age of eligibility from 35 to 45, men still could provide 
substitutes to serve in their stead.  Even so, many congressional representatives hoped 
that raising the age limit to 45 would eliminate almost all potential surrogate combatants.  
This helps explain in part why Congress then amended the number of occupations 
protected from the draft through statutory exemptions.  Excluded groups actually 
increased, placing even more men outside of the law’s scope.  Many of the new 
occupations spared included artisans and professionals.  Even so, the new series of laws 
for conscription caused considerable rifts in the besieged nation.28 
Although alterations in occupational restrictions and age limits produced 
considerable tension, few issues were as politically explosive as a new law providing 
draft exemptions to large slaveholders and their overseers.  Concerns about slave 
discipline grew exponentially as the war dragged on and more men left for the front.  It 
became increasingly difficult for rural communities to provide adequate numbers of 
young men staffing slave patrols.  Congress labored to remedy anxieties about possible 
servile insurrection by drafting and then passing as a law exempting plantation overseers.  
Popularly know “twenty-slave law” - more derisively labeled the “twenty-nigger law” - 
the new legislation was highly controversial.  The law required that in order to secure the 
proper security over large numbers of slaves, “…one person, either as agent, owner, or 
overseer on each plantation . . . is required to be kept by the laws or ordinances of any 
States, and on which there is no white male adult not liable to do military service, and in 
States having no such law, one person agent, owner or overseer, on each plantation of 
twenty negroes, and on which there is no white males adult not liable for military 
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service.”  This legislation, more than any other, led to the multitudes of accusations that 
the South engaged in a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight.  An overwhelming 
majority of congressmen and newspapers supported the measure and tried to explain its 
necessity but they had much difficulty convincing small slaveholders and non-
slaveholding yeomen that the law was indeed essential.29  
More controversy arose when Davis once again requested and received 
congressional approval to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, this time during the period 
of legislative recess between the second and third sessions.  Worries of Union 
encroachment remained and certainly factored into the Congress’s decision granting the 
president the power to suspend habeas corpus.  New and equally dispiriting concerns also 
guided the measure, however.  The first conscript law did not enjoy a popular reception 
from many Confederates.  Southerners had long harbored suspicions of an intrusive and 
expansive central power.  They also were unaccustomed to making significant forfeitures 
to government and scores of citizens believed they already made more than adequate 
sacrifice to the cause.  Most Confederates (particularly those in regions still untouched by 
Union arms) came to accept the conscript laws and contributed their men, often 
begrudgingly.  For others, however, the conscript laws were simply too great of a 
demand.  Men began to defy the law.  Some simply refused to report to camp, only 
joining the army through draft officials’ intimidation and force.  A number of men 
violently resisted.  Absconders shirking the draft and deserters already in the army 
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formed guerilla bands and preyed upon conscription agents, Confederate and Union 
troops, and even their fellow citizens.  Others never supported the Confederate cause to 
begin with.  The piney woods of north Mississippi, middle Alabama, western North 
Carolina, northeast Georgia, east Tennessee and southwest Virginia were rife with 
disloyal men, many who used the conscript law as validation for counterrevolutionary 
and Unionist activities.  These internal tensions certainly factored into Congress’s 
decision limiting Davis’s power suspending habeas corpus to the period spanning from 
the adjournment of the second session and ending thirty days into the third session.30 
Many voters went to the polls distraught over crushing military defeats at 
Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and Chattanooga.  Additionally, the 1863 
congressional elections turned on such issues as conscription, exemptions from 
compulsory service, and the suspension of habeas corpus, issues that many incumbents 
had difficulty defending to increasingly dispirited and war-weary constituencies.  The 
campaigns and returns in 1863 make it difficult to assess the public’s support for Davis 
and his manpower initiatives.  Original secessionists and Democrats lost representation 
while former Unionists and Whigs gained members, initially indicating that increasing 
numbers of Confederates opposed aspects of the war effort.  
 Closer analysis leads to further questions, however.  Nearly half of the voting 
districts were either occupied by Union forces or severely disrupted by combat.  Many 
newspapers folded due to inflation, material shortages, and conquest, resulting in minimal 
press coverage for many elections.  Many candidates once again ran unopposed.  Other 
races focused primarily on local concerns and less on national affairs.  Consequently, 
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arguments proclaiming the 1863 elections as a direct referendum on conscription and 
civil liberties are exaggerations.31 
The fourth session of the First Congress convened on December 7, 1863, a month 
after states held elections for legislative seats.  The president presented his agenda for the 
lame-duck assembly on December 8, once again expressing his desire for revisions to the 
conscript system.  Major military setbacks withered Confederate defenses and 
necessitated more men in the ranks as soon as possible.  It is also possible Davis harbored 
uncertainties regarding the incoming Congress’s makeup and cooperation.  The current 
legislature had already provided the president with two conscript laws, and Davis hoped 
for continued cooperation before it adjourned for the last time.  Despite losses of men and 
setbacks in the field, he declared, “the army is believed to be in all respects in better 
conditions than at any previous period of the war.”  Even so, he stressed the necessity of 
obtaining more troops by revising the conscript law yet again, citing the need to match 
the Union’s June and October 1863 draft orders that called for 600,000 new men.  “In 
view of the large conscription recently ordered by the enemy and their subsequent call for 
volunteers, to be followed if ineffectual by a still further draft, we are admonished that no 
effort must be spared to add largely to our effective force as promptly as possible.”   
Davis also requested the abolition of the substitute system, noting that the “policy 
of granting this privilege has not been sustained by experience.  Not only has the 
numerical strength of the Army been seriously impaired by the frequent desertions for 
which substitutes have become notorious, but dissatisfaction has been excited among 
those who have been unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the opportunity thus 
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afforded of avoiding the military service of their country.”  He also requested all those 
who had previously avoided duty by hiring substitutes to enroll for military service.  
Finally, he mildly criticized the current system of exemption and appealed for change.  
Although he maintained Congress’s motive “has not been to confer privileges on classes . 
. . the result would,” he suggested, “be better obtained by enrolling all such persons and 
allowing details to be made of the number necessary to meet the wants of the country.  
Considerable numbers are believed to be now exempted from the military service that are 
not needful to the public in their civil vocation.”32 
The Senate attempted several bold measures shortly after receiving Davis’s 
memorandum.  Albert G. Brown took his president’s message to heart, introducing a 
resolution on December 10 that essentially placed the nation on a total war footing.  
Louis T. Wigfall offered a bill in a similar vein the next day, making all white males 
between the ages of 16 and 60 liable for military duty.  Although both initiatives would 
eventually be tabled, they served as a clear indication that many in the upper house were 
receptive to streamlining the draft process.  The drive for greater consolidation of 
manpower did yield swift action on one project – the abolishment of substitution.  After a 
bit of tinkering, Congress quickly sent it to Davis.  By December 28, Davis signed the 
finalized bill ending the practice and then approved the law requiring all former 
principals to enlist on January 5, 1864.  Both bills had passed the houses by wide 
margins.  The House voted 52-13 on both bills and the Senate voted 17-4 and 17-2, 
respectively.33 
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With a few exceptions, there was little heated debate over the new conscription 
law.  Both houses carefully deliberated refinements of the draft and its exemptions, 
slowly designing a law that they hoped would satisfy Davis.  The third conscript act 
passed on February 17, 1864 – the third anniversary of Davis’s provisional inauguration.  
While not the levee en masse that Davis hoped for, the law made even more men 
potentially liable for conscription and took bold steps to remedy criticisms of class 
discrimination.  More than half of the occupations once exempted now became liable for 
military duty.  Most of the jobs still excluded were professionals and public servants; 
those now within the law’s reach were engaged in farming and industry.  The overseer 
exemption was modified to now exclude men who watched over 15 or more slaves, 
mollifying some complaints that prior legislation protected only the planter class.  
Additionally, the new law required overseers and planters to supply the government with 
100 pounds of bacon (or 100 pounds of pork and 100 pounds of beef) for each able-
bodied slave they held.  An additional obligation by large slaveholders included the 
mandate that they sell surplus goods and produce to the government or soldiers’ families 
at discounted prices.  More families stood the chance of losing their breadwinners, after 
all.  Modified age limits for the draft now ranged from 17 to 50.34 
Again, Congress granted Davis the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and 
he signed the measure into law on February 16, 1864.  The process from bill to law was 
less harmonious than previous measures.  In a February 3 joint message, Davis appealed 
to the Congress to grant him the right to execute the power to declare martial law once 
again.  This time, however, the request had a strikingly ominous tone to it.  He warned 
that the nation was rife with Union spies and a significant number of disloyal 
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Confederates, some even within the capital city of Richmond.  He also feared that servile 
insurrections were increasingly probable, even alleging that Benjamin Butler was 
concocting a scheme to incite slave revolts.  Furthermore, he wanted added legal muscle 
to counteract contentious state legislation enabling local and state judges to issue writs of 
habeas corpus when the military sought the apprehension of suspected traitors and draft 
dodgers.35  
Congress reluctantly agreed to give Davis permission this time.  The tone of 
debate is unknown, as both houses conducted their deliberations in secret session.  The 
final bill that Davis signed limited his suspending powers to 90 days after the Second 
Congress’s first session began.  The lame-duck nature of this final session certainly 
factored into the decision, as did a greater sense of reluctance by many congressmen to 
increase the scope of Davis’s powers.  The new writ law was much more limited in its 
scope, granting the power to only Davis, Secretary of War James Seddon, and the army 
commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department.  Previous habeas laws were not as 
restrictive and allowed Davis a much more expansive authority in its delegation.  
Offenses for apprehending suspects now had clear definitions and were limited to the 
most egregious offenses against the government.  Confederate soldiers and law 
enforcement officials needed palpable evidence to seize men suspected of crimes such as 
treason, conspiracy to overthrow the government, assisting the enemy, spying, or 
encouraging slave revolt.  Confederate officials were now tightly constrained in their 
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ability to arrest and hold, without due process of the law, men whose detention was 
essential for the public good.36 
 
 ●     ●     ● 
 
The conscript laws did little to ease class strife.  Relations between the planter and 
yeomen classes, which were rather harmonious before the war, grew increasingly tense as 
the conflict prolonged.  The poorer yeomen, tenants and laborers generally could not 
afford to pay exemption fees or hire substitutes; their jobs usually were not the 
occupations protected by exemption clauses.  Many poor whites would use the series of 
conscript laws as justification to desert or abscond from service.  Some even used the 
laws to engage as an excuse to form bands that engaged in guerilla warfare with conscript 
agents or small gangs of criminals that terrorized those remaining on the home front; 
many of these lawless bands failed to make distinctions regarding their prey.  One must 
not lose sight of the overwhelming support that the cause received from much of the 
middle and lower classes, however.  Thousands of men outside of the planter class rushed 
to arms with the commencement of hostilities; many more volunteered with the passage 
of the first conscript act.  The planter aristocracy hardly had a monopoly on support for 
the cause.  Had that been the case, the armies in the field would have been much smaller 
and the war much shorter.37   
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While Davis did get the conscript laws he needed in order to save his nation’s 
army, they lacked the breadth that he desired for maximum effectiveness.  Draft measures 
also suffered from irregular execution.  Support from congressmen was often tepid.  
Many had strong commitments to the war effort but were often reluctant to yield to 
Davis’s wishes of blanket enrollment; they simply did not want to strip their 
constituencies of the men needed to keep state militias and the civilian sector functional.  
Others, such as Reuben Davis of Mississippi and William Yancey, wanted to keep a 
check on the executive’s authority; they thought Davis’s power was escalating to 
dangerous levels and desired to curb it.  Solons such as these often veiled protests by 
appealing in the name of states’ rights.  Then there were others among the inchoate 
opposition who simply did not like Davis, such as Foote.38 
By spring 1862, Union forces disrupted or captured a significant portion of the 
Confederacy.  The available pool of men to draw from continued to shrink as the war 
dragged, due to continued conquest and disturbance by Federals.  Given the chaos that 
engulfed much of the Confederacy, it is remarkable that the conscription laws would 
eventually bring well over 80,000 men into the ranks.  The number of men who 
volunteered rather than face the scorn and lack of privileges afforded conscripts remains 
unknown, but it certainly was high.   
Despite the criticisms leveled at the conscription system, it was a remarkable 
success.  The first law certainly saved the army.  The series of laws did allow for greater 
federal consolidation of the war effort and were pivotal in prolonging the Confederacy’s 
lifespan.  The First Congress was certainly more cooperative than the Second Congress, 
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but the warfare sapped the nation of men and resources by 1864.  While there were 
indeed a greater number of malcontents and obstructionists in the Second Congress, 
almost all still supported the war effort.  Overt resistance usually came from men who 
simply believed their constituents had already sacrificed more than they could bear for a 
quickly dying cause.   
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CHAPTER III 
SUSTAINING A NEW NATION: 
DEBATES ON CONFEDERATE FINANCE AND SUPPLY 
 
 
 
 
The size of the Confederacy’s armies never matched the Union’s masses, despite 
the institution of a vigorous military draft.  While Jefferson Davis and the Confederate 
Congress certainly could have enacted conscript laws more expansive in scope, the 
Confederacy never could keep pace with the North in terms of manpower.  The Union’s 
population of 22 million dwarfed the Confederacy’s 9 million, including 4 million slaves.  
The nation’s defenses also suffered from an initial disadvantage in materiel and industry 
– shortcomings the Confederacy never overcame.  Hampered by inadequate industrial 
and natural resources, the Confederate war effort also suffered from inadequate financial 
foresight and preparation.  The southern states were typically cash-poor; most invested in 
slaves, land, and agricultural products.  The Confederacy had very small holdings in hard 
currency, totaling between 25 to 27 million dollars in specie.  In addition, Confederate 
citizens were unaccustomed to heavy tax burdens and expected a short war requiring 
minimal sacrifice.   
A swift and bloodless conflict never materialized.  As the war dragged on, the 
Provisional and First Congresses faced mounting fiscal crises.  Both the executive and 
legislative branches lacked adequate resources and financial expertise from the outset.  
Misguided hopes lingered, particularly those concerning the political and economic 
impact of cotton.  Not only did many southerners believe the staple crop would keep both 
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the private sector and the war effort afloat, they also assumed northern and European 
reliance on cotton would force a peace settlement and independence.  But King Cotton 
did not deter the United States from its goals of victory and reunification.  It also could 
not persuade France or Great Britain to open its coffers, nor could it garner diplomatic or 
military assistance from the Western European powers.  These delusions contributed 
heavily to the Confederate economy’s collapse.   
The overestimation of cotton’s impact was not the only misstep committed by the 
Confederate government.  The hopes for a brief conflict also contributed to many 
shortsighted economic pursuits by the executive and legislative branches.  Initial 
expectations for the war’s swift resolution persuaded Davis, Secretary of the Treasury 
Christopher Memminger, and Congress to seek short-term economic solutions.  Rather 
than implement wide-scale taxation on the Confederacy’s most valued assets, land and 
slaves, many in Congress preferred pumping in more currency or cotton bonds, both of 
which became increasingly worthless in value.  Once Davis and Memminger called for 
more extensive fiscal measures, Congress successfully blocked or diluted the potency of 
many such proposals.  Fears of an expansive federal government and belief that 
southerners had already sacrificed enough for the cause fueled much of the congressional 
opposition.  Others opposed the Davis administration’s economic policy because they 
believed the president and secretary of the treasury simply did not know what they were 
doing.  In many ways, Congress was right, for Davis knew little about the nuances of 
finance.  While Memminger had a more expansive fiscal background, he was slow in his 
response to the nation’s mounting economic crises.  Congress’s lack of financial 
proficiency did little to help matters, however.   
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A crippling deficiency of adequate railroads, easily navigable water routes, and 
roads also hindered the Confederate war effort.  Not only did a faulty infrastructure 
impede the war effort, but it also devastated the Confederate economy.  Establishing self 
–sufficient means of transport - a daunting prospect even during peacetime- would prove 
impossible once hostilities commenced.  The central government never overcame these 
compounding economic disadvantages hobbling the nation, and it struggled mightily with 
new challenges plaguing them.  By the time the First Confederate Congress adjourned for 
the last time in February 1864, the southern economy teetered on the verge of collapse. 
 
●   ●   ● 
 
Prior to the onset of hostilities, the states of the Confederacy monopolized the 
leading export.  Southern cotton totaled one-half of all American products sold abroad by 
1860.  European markets, particularly British and French, voraciously consumed the 
staple.  The English textile industries boomed during the antebellum period and became 
an economic colossus on the world stage.  On the eve of the Civil War, Britain’s textile 
manufacturers purchased up to 80 percent of their cotton from the South.  Southerners 
were highly cognizant that northern mills and the international market relied heavily on 
their cotton product.  The South had a virtual monopoly on raw material sent to northern 
textile industries; disunion and warfare certainly would disrupt the trade of material 
essential to major European industries as well.  The perceived northern and European 
dependence on King Cotton gave the Confederacy a false sense of confidence that 
economic concerns would maintain or restore peace during the southern nation’s early 
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months of existence.  Most southerners believed that northern disruption of the cotton 
trade - via blockade, warfare, or both – would trigger an international financial crisis.  
The great European powers, most notably Great Britain, would face a choice: rush to aid 
southern arms or face certain economic ruin.  The hopes that economic pragmatism, both 
by northern neighbors and European customers, could uphold the peace quickly proved 
misguided and short-lived.1   
When Lincoln ordered the blockade of the Confederate coastline on April 19, 
1861, Confederates held out hopes that the resulting impact on British and French 
markets would bring about swift diplomatic intervention.  If naval trade could not 
resume, almost all Confederates believed that the European powers would respond with 
military force.  The expected foreign intervention never arrived.  Bumper crops in the late 
1850s led to a glut of cotton on the international market.  In addition, British agents 
purchased record amounts in 1859 and 1860, sensing that conflict loomed near.  As a 
result, warehouses held record surpluses by the time of secession and warfare.  By 1863, 
the British found adequate alternate sources for cotton and began importing Egyptian and 
Indian crops.  The demand for Confederate cotton did not intensify during the war.  
Instead, it plummeted. 
  The search for and acquisition of new cotton outposts came during British 
debates for intervention on behalf of the Confederacy.  Prime Minister John Temple, 
Lord Palmerston, and his foreign secretary Lord John Russell certainly found the 
prospect of an independent Confederate States of America attractive.  The Confederacy’s 
                                                 
1 For more on cotton trade, see Stuart Bruchey, Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy: 1790-
1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), Frank Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign 
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959) and Paul 
Escott, After Secession (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1977) 174-175. 
  65
survival would weaken the United States as a commercial and naval rival.  British 
assistance in exchange for southern independence also meant that the Confederacy’s 
recompense for alliance would result in acquiescence to an expanded British economic 
and political presence in the Western Hemisphere.  The high costs of the recently 
concluded Crimean War, however, gave both Palmerston and Russell pause.  In addition, 
the Trent affair from November 1861 to January 1862 led the British leadership to 
conclude that any decisive measures on the Confederacy’s behalf would probably result 
in warfare with the United States.  As a result, the British never made official overtures 
for diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy, nor did they make serious efforts to end 
the Union blockade.2 
 Great Britain also wished to avoid setting a naval precedent that could work 
against her in a future conflict.  Davis and his diplomats pressed Britain for a ruling that 
stated the Union blockade was physically ineffective.  Such a declaration meant the 
blockade did not pertain to non-belligerent powers, such as France and England.  In an 
interesting twist, the Confederacy adopted the stance that the United States had taken in 
earlier European conflicts – the blockading power must completely seal off its enemy’s 
ports.  From the onset of the blockade until war’s end, Confederate blockade-runners 
successfully evaded Union naval ships and made their way to Caribbean and European 
harbors.  The success of these vessels, the Confederacy argued, offered tangible proof of 
the Union’s inability to obstruct southern naval traffic.  During the Civil War, however, 
the Union now adopted the stance that the British always held: patrolling warships 
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making a concerted effort to deny exit or entry to a port constituted a legally binding 
blockade.  Great Britain would not reverse its long held naval policy, declaring the 
blockade lawful in early 1862.3 
 The French were reluctant to do anything without British assurances.  Emperor 
Napoleon III maintained an officially neutral position, despite his anxieties regarding the 
potential economic difficulties posed by the loss of Confederate cotton and his personal 
sympathy for Confederate independence.  In 1861, Louis Napoleon already had French 
soldiers in Mexico as part of an international debt collection force and seized the 
opportunity provided by the American Civil War for further intervention in Mexican 
affairs.  By June 1863, Napoleon III’s forces overthrew the government of Benito Juarez, 
and Napoleon placed Archduke Maxmillian of Austria as a puppet governor.  
Confederates remained optimistic that Napoleon would seek Confederate 
recognition and support for Maxmillian’s regime in return for Maxmillian’s recognition 
of the Confederacy.  Consequently, de facto French recognition of the Confederacy 
would have resulted.  By summer 1863, however, the course of war turned decidedly in 
favor of the Union, and Napoleon III hedged his bets on his Mexican empire’s survival 
by openly courting U.S. diplomatic recognition.  Louis Napoleon did not wish to annoy 
the Lincoln administration with formal talks with the Confederacy.  Lincoln and 
Secretary of State William H. Seward, for their part, intimated possible diplomatic 
recognition of the Maxmillian dictatorship in order to prevent a potential Mexican-
Confederate alliance.4 
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The Confederate Congress did little that positively affected international 
commerce.  One of the few successful foreign financial endeavors came not from 
congressional action, but from the Confederate minister in France, John Slidell.  In 
October 1862, he successfully brokered a deal with the Parisian firm Erlanger and 
Company.  The Erlanger Loan gave the Confederacy a $15 million advance secured by 
the future sale of Confederate cotton bonds.  Most of the loan’s subsequent proceeds 
went towards the purchase of French naval ships.  When Davis requested Congress’s 
approval, some congressmen thought his appeals for legislative sanction unnecessary.  
Others found the loan request too small and desired for a much larger advance, some 
even suggesting $50 million.  When Confederate secretary of the treasury Christopher 
Memminger insisted on the original amount in the loan, Congress relented and passed the 
measure.  Although the secret nature of congressional proceedings on the matter prevents 
scholars from knowing the nature of debates on the Erlanger Loan, opposition was short-
lived and fragmented.  By January 30, 1863, Davis gave final approval to the Erlanger 
Loan.5 
Davis nominated Christopher G. Memminger of South Carolina as the first 
secretary of the treasury, and Congress unanimously confirmed the choice on February 
21, 1861.6  The German-born secretary’s rise to prominence before the war truly was 
remarkable.  Orphaned at age four shortly after settling in Charleston, Memminger lived 
in an orphanage for seven years until a prominent local attorney, Thomas Bennett, 
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became his guardian and benefactor.  Impressed with his natural intelligence and 
aptitude, Bennett encouraged and supported Memminger’s education, enrolling him at 
South Carolina College and then encouraging his study for the bar.  Memminger rose to 
prominence as a Charleston lawyer and gained a seat in South Carolina state legislature, 
where he established himself as a moderate states’ rights advocate who opposed the 
concept of nullification and its implementation in the crisis of 1832.  He gained the 
confidence of his colleagues in Columbia by demonstrating remarkable skill in economic 
matters.  He had multiple terms in the state legislature, serving as the chairman of the 
committee on finance, and made efforts to regulate the state’s banking industry.  He also 
functioned as a Charleston school commissioner and was on the Board of Trustees for 
South Carolina College for over thirty years. 
Fire-eating swept though South Carolina in the 1850s, yet Memminger 
maintained a moderate political stance until John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 
October 1859 and Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860.  He quickly became 
an advocate for disunion, and voters chose him a member of the state’s secession 
convention.  In January 1861, he joined the Provisional Confederate Congress as a South 
Carolina delegate.  While serving as a congressman in Montgomery, Memminger played 
an integral role in the drafting of the Confederate Constitution.  The newly elected 
Jefferson Davis needed a moderate South Carolinian for his cabinet and followed Robert 
Woodward Barnwell’s urgings to select Memminger as secretary of the treasury.  
Following his unanimous confirmation, Memminger struggled with the onerous task of 
managing Confederate finances.  Once hostilities commenced, few of his proposals 
succeeded.  Memminger’s trade proposals, such as support for a tariff and opposition to 
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the Confederacy serving as cotton brokerage, rankled many.  Most opposition to these 
measures resulted from solons’ constitutional beliefs that such proposals violated the 
rights of private agriculturists.  Debate over foreign trade initiatives became moot due to 
the crippling Union blockade.  Lacking easily liquidated assets and choked off from 
foreign commerce, Memminger had little choice but to fund the war effort with escalating 
amounts of currency backed with only trace amounts of specie.  Exacerbating the soaring 
inflation that inevitably resulted from a depreciated currency was reluctance by 
Provisional and First Congresses to increase taxes.  For their part, Davis and Memminger 
also opposed new taxes until the midpoint of the war. 
The relationship between the First Congress and Memminger grew increasingly 
acrimonious.  Congressional denigration of the secretary increased, and he gradually 
shouldered the brunt of criticism for the nation’s faltering system of finance.  The Second 
Congress placed even more pressure on Memminger, blaming him for the near-total 
collapse of the Confederate economy.  Faced with strident opposition by this Congress 
that offered little support for his current policy or new financial initiatives, he finally 
resigned on June 15, 1864.7  
Memminger, like many of his colleagues, initially envisioned an unobtrusive 
central government with limited influence and power.  The new secretary of the treasury 
made few suggestions for centralized methods of generating revenue.  Like many of his 
peers, Memminger believed that a possible war against the United States would be a short 
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one.  Not surprisingly, he made modest requests to fund defensive measures during the 
first months of the Confederacy.  
When the Confederate Congress first convened in Montgomery in February 1861, 
it operated on a $500,000 budget – a donation by the state of Alabama.  The first national 
tax implemented in the Confederate States was the then-current U.S. tariff.  The 
Provisional Congress voted to honor the Union import duty on February 9, 1861, a result 
of the agreement to continue all United States laws consistent with the provisional 
Confederate Constitution.  The secret accounts of the Provisional Congress’s sessions 
reveal little in terms of debate, but the decision to maintain the old tax must have 
produced acrimony among some Montgomery representatives.  The Louisiana delegation 
introduced measures on February 16 stressing the necessity to preserve the current system 
of tariffs.  Louisiana was rich in cotton and sugar, and New Orleans was the largest port 
city in the Confederacy.  Not surprisingly, the state’s delegation had a keen interest in 
upholding sources of revenue and quite possibly perceived they were under attack.8  The 
Louisiana delegation’s fears proved prophetic; amendments to the tariff came shortly 
thereafter.  On February 18, Congress passed a bill to exempt from duty certain 
commodities, including “all agricultural products, in their natural state.”9  Yet ten days 
later legislation passed mandating the taxation of all cotton exports at the rate of one-
eighth of a cent per pound.  Davis and the Congress hoped the tax would fund the 
issuance of ten year, eight percent bonds, totaling 15 million dollars.  Resistance from 
cotton planters and the forthcoming Union blockade would limit cotton loan 
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subscriptions to only 11 million dollars.  Even so, it would prove to be one of the more 
effective means of Confederate finance, due in large part to its early passage.10 
The conservative nature of the first session’s tax policy demonstrates considerable 
reluctance by the Provisional Congress to provide the central government with substantial 
revenue.  Not only did the Congress attempt to lighten the tariff but it also hesitated to 
grant the commander in chief unrestricted access to war materiel.  On February 26, 
shortly after assuming office, Davis pressed Congress to grant him greater control of 
defensive measures, proposing that the Confederacy seize all Federal arms, munitions, 
forts, arsenals, and naval yards in southern states.  Congress did pass a resolution 
regarding states’ cession of Federal holdings, but it was merely a resolution that 
recommended that states yield their captures of Union property and was not mandatory.11  
Of course, one must bear in mind that the first session of the Provisional Congress 
witnessed no armed conflict between the United States and the Confederacy.  This may 
explain in part the lack of urgency by many congressmen to mobilize defenses or accrue 
assets for warfare.   
Provisional congressmen rushed back for their second session following the onset 
of hostilities, convening on April 29, 1861.  Davis’s written message presented that day 
addressed the Confederacy’s lack of resources, and called on both private citizens and the 
Congress to act.  For the former, he requested private vessels to join the Confederate 
navy; for the latter, he called for more defense appropriations.12  For most of the session, 
Congress deliberated over financial measures but acted slowly.  Congress issued a 
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censure of Lincoln and the Union blockade on May 3, two weeks after Lincoln ordered 
the cordon of the Confederate coastline.13  It considered a bill granting Davis presidential 
control of telegraph lines within Confederate borders before killing it on May 9.14  By 
May 16, the first Produce Loan passed, a revenue-generating proposal endorsed by both 
Memminger and Davis.  Under the direction of a leading southern economist J.D.B. 
DeBow, treasury agents and congressmen canvassed their home districts purchasing 
staple crops in exchange for 20-year bonds with an 8 percent interest rate.  The first 
Produce Loan allotment was designed to raise 50 million dollars in revenue for the 
national government.  Initially, congressmen and loan agents had success pushing the 
loan, and it appeared enough investors would subscribe to meet the goal.  Naturally, the 
prospect delighted Davis and Congress. 
The third session of the Provisional Congress convened in Richmond on July 20, 
1861.  Jefferson Davis’s memorandum delivered to Congress the same day glossed over 
issues of finance and material shortages.  Instead, Davis primarily attacked Lincoln’s 
troop allocations of 500,000 men and budget appropriations of $400 million in military 
expenditures – measures Davis lambasted as clear indications that Lincoln intended 
conquest.15  In an effort to boost his nation’s morale, Davis did go on to praise 
agriculturists for excellent harvests.  “The grain crops, generally, have since been 
harvested, and the yield has proven to be the most abundant known in our history,” Davis 
noted.  He asserted that he and many others believed “the supply adequate to two years' 
consumption of our population.  Cotton, sugar, and tobacco, forming the surplus 
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production of our agriculture, and furnishing the basis of our commercial interchanges, 
present the most cheering promise; and a kind Providence has smiled on the labor which 
extracts the teeming wealth of our soil in all portions of our Confederacy.”16  Hope 
remained high that the southern wealth in agricultural resources and the Union’s attempts 
to deny European markets access to Confederate exports, particularly cotton, would result 
in foreign intervention and a swift end to the war.  Davis then went on to praise initial 
investors in the Produce Loan who answered their government’s call for assistance. He 
wrote, “In the single article of cotton the subscriptions to the loan proposed by the 
Government cannot fall short of fifty millions of dollars, and will probably largely exceed 
that amount; and scarcely an article required for the consumption of the Army, is 
provided otherwise than by subscription to the produce loan.”17   
Despite Davis’s glowing assessment of Confederate finance, Congress resumed 
debate on the best means to sustain the nation.  John Perkins, Jr. of Louisiana introduced 
a bill on July 29 to suspend all import duties except for goods originating in the United 
States – a clear effort to make blockade running more attractive to foreigners.  The third 
session saw no progress on the matter, and congressmen eventually tabled the bill on 
August 28.18  Unauthorized smuggling of cotton out of Confederate harbors, thereby 
circumventing national levies imposed on the product, quickly became commonplace.  
Congress moved to end the practice.  In an effort to obtain cotton revenues more 
effectively, Congress passed a bill prohibiting cotton exports except through designated 
ports of entry.  Davis signed it into law on August 3.19   
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  Because tariff duties alone would not fund the war effort, Congress sought new 
measures to fund the nation’s expenses.  Debates for a comprehensive war tax began on 
August 8, 1861, and Davis signed the proposition into law on August 19.  Although the 
negotiations took place in secret session, clues remain indicating the careful and 
deliberate nature of planning.  For a week, Congress focused on little else but the tax 
legislation.  By the time Congress constructed an acceptable bill on August 16, it agreed 
on a resolution offered by Duncan Kenner of Louisiana stating that once Davis signed the 
bill into law, the public record should show a unanimous vote by the Congress.  However 
odious some congressmen may have found the notion of their central government taxing 
private citizens, they passed Kenner’s resolution by an overwhelming majority and did 
record a unanimous vote on the war tax once Davis returned it on August 20.  Overall, 
the tax itself was a relatively light duty.  It required that Confederate citizens relinquish 
one-half of one percent on all taxable wealth held.  Immunities protected poor men 
volunteering for service as well as their families, exempting personal holdings of $500 or 
less and family estates of $1000 or less.  All families, regardless of their military status, 
received a $500 deduction.  Additionally, all schools, charities, and religious 
organizations enjoyed property exemptions.20  
  The first war tax required only modest sacrifices by most Confederates, and the 
Confederate press overwhelmingly supported the measure.  Opposition papers offered 
only mild rebuttals, arguing that taxation should remain a matter for individual states.  
Cognizant of such resistance on a wider scale, the law designated Confederate states as 
separate tax divisions and even offered a 10 per cent rebate if complete returns arrived to 
the national treasury before April 1, 1862.  States were slow in their collection or 
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compliance with Confederate tax laws, however.  Disruptions by Union armies or the 
often-viable threat of invasion often made state collection agents’ jobs impossible.  
National laws occasionally conflicted with state assessment regulations, resulting in an 
obstinate adherence to old laws or confusion over which one should take precedence.  
Secretary Memminger also recommended the issue of 150 million dollars in currency in 
July, and Congress responded by amending Produce Loan on August 19, issuing an 
additional 100 million dollars in treasury notes.21   
The last week and a half of the session witnessed considerable debate on the 
sequestration of property held by United States citizens and Unionist sympathizers within 
Confederate borders.  Not until the United States passed laws confiscating southerners’ 
property in the North did the thrust for comprehensive sequestration laws in the South 
slowly gain momentum.  On August 30, the Confederacy established its own 
sequestration law.  Davis signed the amendments into law on December 23 and again on 
February 15, 1862, one of the final days of the Provisional Congress’s existence.  The 
laws had minimal economic impact but served as effective propaganda tools by ordering 
that all proceeds from enemy property seized by the Confederacy go to southerners 
deprived of their own property by the Union’s seizure laws.22  Likewise, a finished bill on 
states’ claims versus the Confederacy was slow to develop, and none resulted during the 
third session.23 
The fourth session of the Provisional Congress lasted only one day: September 3, 
1861. No discussions on finance took place.  The fifth session convened barely two 
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months later, assembling in Richmond on November 18.  Congress received Davis’s 
message the next day, in which he praised the efforts of southern farmers but stressed the 
need for more industry to meet the demands of war.24  Although inflation and currency 
depreciation already hampered many Confederate business endeavors, the president still 
expressed confidence in the nation’s financial health.25  Davis then attacked the Union 
blockade, stressing the inefficiency of naval barriers resulted in violation of international 
law.  Even so, Davis heralded the nation’s increasing independence, scoffing at the 
Union’s attempts to choke off the Confederacy’s lifelines of supply.26 
While Davis wanted centralized control of weapons and munitions manufacture, 
Congress hesitated and retained hope that the private sector could meet demands.  On 
December 10, the Committee on Military Affairs prepared to debate a proposed law 
granting bonuses to private businesses and individuals contributing to the manufacture of 
arms.27  By January 13, Congress approved a bill encouraging the manufacture of small 
arms, saltpeter, and gunpowder.  The measure promised 50 per cent advances for 
investors but required entrepreneurs take an oath of allegiance to the nation before 
dispersing funds, in hopes of deterring fraud.  On January 23, Davis returned his veto, 
objecting to the clause providing 50 per cent advances to investors who were required 
only to devote 25 per cent of their own funding upfront.  Leery of speculators who could 
defraud the government, Davis balked at Congress’s proposals.  He attacked what he 
considered redundancies in the bill.  For example, Davis criticized the need to encourage 
additional manufacture of gunpowder and stressed that the Confederacy already had 
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enough powder mills.  The nation needed more munitions and materiel in a finished state, 
Davis argued.28  On February 12, Congress made an unsuccessful effort to override 
Davis’s veto, killing the bill for the last time.29 
During the final session of the Provisional Congress, the president and his 
supporters pressed Congress for legislation enabling governmental assistance for material 
support.  On December 18, Davis sent a message to Congress requesting funding for new 
railroads.  Congress would not comply with Davis’s wishes for rail appropriations, 
however, citing the constitutional ban on internal improvements.  Hopes that private 
businesses and state governments could meet demands for new and refurbished track still 
lingered.30 
A highly critical appraisal of the military’s financial and supply sources came on 
January 29, 1862, when Congressman Thomas Waul of Texas issued an exhaustive report 
on inadequacies in the quartermaster, commissary, and medical departments.  Waul cited 
numerous shortcomings within the quartermaster’s department such as volunteer troops 
lacking adequate clothing, too few storage depots, and a critical paucity in available 
railroad track and service.  He went on to demand that troops receive their pay on a 
bimonthly basis.31  Waul then urged for more organization in the commissary department, 
emphasizing the need for more cooks, more variety in rations provided to troops in the 
field, and funding for rations for the sick and convalescent.32  Finally, Waul cited 
numerous deficiencies in the medical department, centering on inadequate preparation 
and provision.  Few army surgeons had proper instruments, a scarcity exacerbated by 
                                                 
28 JCC, I, 696. 
29 JCC, I, 661-664, 696, 808-809. 
30 JCC, I, 586. 
31 JCC, I, 721-722. 
32 JCC, I, 722-723. 
  78
“the present state of our commercial atrophy,” he argued.  Even so, Waul “presumed that 
sufficient encouragement would secure the manufacture of instruments within the 
Confederate states.”33 
The unfavorable assessment offered in Waul’s report exemplified mounting 
discontent with the Confederacy’s growing shortages.  The quartermaster and 
commissary departments increasingly became targets of criticism.  Lucius Northrop, the 
Confederate commissary general, was an old friend of Jefferson Davis and served in the 
U.S. Subsistence Department when Davis was Franklin Pierce’s secretary of war.  When 
his home state of South Carolina seceded, Northrop resigned his post in the U.S. Army.  
Following the Confederacy’s formation, Northrop accepted Davis’s offer as acting 
commissary general of the Confederacy with the rank of lieutenant colonel.  In June 
1861, Northrop received a promotion to full colonel and became commissary general.   
Northrop faced a tremendous challenge, and the effects of warfare made it 
increasingly difficult.  He assumed his post with very little bureaucratic structure in 
place.  The Confederacy also lacked coordinated transportation via railways, roads, or 
rivers, which further hampered Northrop’s efforts to supply armies in the field.  In an 
attempt to streamline resource allotments, Northrop insisted that all commissary agents at 
military posts and in the field report to him.  Had the Confederacy possessed more 
efficient transport and communication, Northrop’s goal for a diligent supply czar 
overseeing the sustenance of all armies in the field might have worked.  Instead, logistical 
shortcomings made supply increasingly problematic, and Northrop’s domineering 
policies angered many commissary agents in the field.  Army officers, soldiers in the 
field, and troops’ families flooded their congressmen with letters complaining 
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vociferously about the scarcity and poor quality of food received in the field.  As the war 
dragged on, Congress made repeated calls for action limiting Northrop’s power or 
removing him from office altogether.  Although Northrop remained in office for the 
duration of the Provisional Congress, he became an increasingly convenient scapegoat for 
Congress and the public at large.34 
Abraham Myers, the first Confederate quartermaster general, received similar 
disparagement from the army and Congress.   Like Northrop’s commissary department, 
Myers’s quartermaster division suffered from a substandard railroad network, an 
increasingly forceful Union blockade, and dwindling manufacturing resources.  By the 
summer of 1863, Myers lost Davis’s support.  While Davis was certainly mindful of the 
logistical impediments hindering Myers’s efforts, many believed that the president’s 
opposition resulted from a feud between the two men’s wives.  While it is doubtful that 
Davis used such petty matters to justify his removal of Myers as quartermaster general, 
the president certainly grew frustrated with Myers’s ability to supply the armies.  He 
replaced Myers with Alexander R. Lawton on August 7, 1863.  Myers protested his 
ouster and claimed Davis violated the Constitution because he failed to consult the Senate 
regarding Lawton’s nomination.  The Senate did request a formal nomination, with which 
Davis complied.  The Senate finally confirmed Lawton in February 1864.35   
The first elected Congress assembled for its initial session on February 18, 1862.  
Although the legislators devoted most of their time to conscription, the establishment of 
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the Supreme Court, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, solons did not 
neglect financial matters entirely.  Desperate for foreign revenue, congressmen made 
repeated efforts to end the tariff.  None of them succeeded.  Senators Edward Sparrow of 
Louisiana and James Phelan of Mississippi made requests for exemptions of all duties 
shortly after Congress convened.36  On March 3, Williamson Oldham of Texas presented 
a bill repealing import duties.  Despite Benjamin Hill’s protests, the Senate placed the bill 
on the committee on the whole’s calendar.37  In secret debates on March 27, the Senate 
voted 17-6 that it lacked constitutional jurisdiction and rejected the repeal of import 
duties.38  One week later, however, the House passed a bill authorizing the free trade of 
all goods except for those originating in the United States.39  The Senate did not pass the 
measure, ignoring Thomas Semmes’s repeated pleas to repeal the tariff.40 
Congressmen also had growing concerns that farmers placed too much emphasis 
on staple crops, thereby neglecting production of food.  On March 10, the House began 
discussing potential legislation regarding cotton and tobacco.41  On March 12, an 11-8 
vote in the Senate killed a measure discouraging commercial planting and encouraging 
the cultivation of grains and livestock.  Three days later, the Senate debated the national 
government’s ability to limit cotton growth.  James Phelan, an extreme Confederate 
nationalist from Davis’s home state of Mississippi, raised the question to his colleagues: 
did the Confederacy indeed have the right of seizure if agriculturists violated potential 
legislation capping production?  Benjamin Hill, who was one of Davis’s most ardent 
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supporters, replied, “Certainly – yes,” but stopped short of endorsing a plan that forced 
farmers to produce foodstuffs.42  Hill’s answer vexed Phelan.  “Is not grain, then, as 
important as saltpetre or arms?” he asked.  “If . . . there were but one farm on which grain 
could be raised, and the owner refused to raise it, could not the government, if necessary, 
make him raise it?”  Hill replied, “The government could do no such thing.  The 
government had no right to make a man make saltpetre, nor guns, nor anything else.  It 
could seize the farm, but could not force the man who owned it to raise any certain grain 
upon it.”43  Williamson Oldham of Texas also rejected Phelan’s proposals, stating, “If we 
had the power to do what the gentleman said, there would be no use for State 
Governments.”44 
Phelan’s sentiments were decidedly in the minority, and in this session, Congress 
refused further consideration of the matter.  Most congressmen recoiled at the prospect of 
forcing their constituents to make even further sacrifices.  After all, Congress was 
debating the first conscription law at the same time.  They also wanted to wait and see if 
state initiatives limiting commercial crop growth would have any effect before redundant 
or additionally restrictive laws took effect.  In the end, the first session did nothing, which 
historian Buck Yearns argued was “a decision justified by the sharp decline during 1862 
in staple crop production.”45 
Although Congress remained apprehensive about the prospect of centralizing the 
nation’s economy, it harbored no such trepidations when faced with amending demands 
for the Produce Loan.  Bond issues soared to $250 million, with very little of it backed by 
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hard currency or specie.  Not surprisingly, costs continued to soar, in large part due to 
inflation.  State payments to the federal government further depreciated the strength of 
treasury holdings.  Following their initial contributions, almost all state debts owed to the 
Confederate treasury came in the form of state bonds for the duration of the war.  Like 
the national currency, state bills also held little or no real value because they lacked 
backing in specie.  Both state and federal governments retained hope that the war would 
end soon, and most did not think an all-inclusive system of taxation necessary for a short-
term conflict.46 
No comprehensive mode of taxation came in the second session of the First 
Congress.  It was a short autumn assembly, meeting from August 18 to October 10, 1862.  
Although Congress considered several financial matters, it generated few significant 
pieces of fiscal legislation.  Salt quickly became a rarity in most southern states once the 
disruptions of war came.  Shortly after convening, Louisiana senators Thomas Semmes 
and Edward Sparrow proposed separate bills authorizing centralization of salt mines and 
springs.  Both pieces of legislation lacked adequate support in the Senate, and the push 
for nationalized salt distribution quickly sputtered.47   
Frustrations with the hardships of war became increasingly apparent.  On October 
8, Benjamin Hill presented a resolution of inquiry for Secretary of War George Randolph 
regarding the military’s interference with interstate trade.  After Hill commented that the 
army’s meddling with the commerce between Tennessee and Georgia “is daily done,” 
Williamson Oldham delivered a stinging invective against the army’s methods of supply 
and the commander in chief.  “A good deal had been said about the danger we were in of 
                                                 
46 Hattaway and Beringer, Jefferson Davis, Confederate President, 195. 
47 SHS, XLV, 234-235, SHS, XLVI, 19-20. 
  83
drifting into a military despotism,” Oldham opined.  He then asserted, “…that despotism 
was already established.”  Edward Sparrow, miffed at Oldham’s accusations, successfully 
moved for President Davis to receive the resolution, not the secretary of war.48 
The brevity of this session precluded lengthy discussions on a new tax bill.  Both 
houses made some efforts to revise methods of assessment but on October 6, the House 
struck out the enacting clause in their proposal, effectively killing the bill.49  On October 
8, William Lowndes Yancey made requests for a new census, a constitutional 
requirement for any new changes in the Confederate tax code.  After Gustavus Henry of 
Tennessee and Robert Ward Johnson of Arkansas noted the impossibility of assessing 
and collecting taxes in states invaded or occupied by Union forces, the Senate agreed to 
postpone consideration of a new census until the third session.50  In that session, the only 
major initiative for meeting financial demands was the passage of a new law granting 
Secretary Memminger the right to borrow $150 million from the states.  The states, 
however, often paid their notes with state bonds that had little to no specie backing 
them.51 
As the war dragged on, armies in the field began impressing food and supplies 
from civilians.  Soldiers often had little choice, for provisions and materiel were 
becoming scarce.  Commissary and quartermaster supplies often could not keep up with 
armed forces, due in large part to the deterioration of methods of transport.  The Union 
blockade of the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, along with the capture in 1863 of the 
Mississippi, made water transport nearly impossible.  Many railways fell into Union 
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hands and were either destroyed or converted into Union lifelines.  Confederate forces 
destroyed other lines rather than allow the enemy to utilize them.  Lines beyond the scope 
of invading armies often suffered from excessive use and neglect.  This disrepair resulted 
from Confederate ironworks focusing almost exclusively on the production of weaponry.  
Inconveniences plaguing railways during peacetime became nightmares with the onset of 
conflict.  Disagreements between connecting railroads over matters such as 
corresponding gauges of track were commonplace and crippled shipments of troops and 
supplies.  When Congress did approve funding for new railways, these projects often 
suffered from logistical delays, inadequate provisions, insufficient funding, and political 
infighting.  For example, Congress approved a loan to build a 48-mile stretch of road 
connecting Danville, Virginia to Greensboro, North Carolina on February 6, 1862.  Only 
when William MacFarland of Virginia added a supplemental travel subsidy for 
congressmen riding the line did it finally pass.52  Robert Toombs moved to reconsider 
passage of the project four days later and filed a petition of protest.  Claiming that he 
spoke on behalf of other states’ rightists, Toombs argued the Confederate Constitution 
did not allow for the internal improvement because it was not a military necessity. 53  
Following the passage of the law, implementation was slow; construction of the 
Greensboro-Danville line took more than two years.  
Lacking adequate transport of supplies, Confederate armies often faced little 
choice but to seize food and supplies from the citizenry.  Even during the initial weeks 
and months of the war, military forces impressed provisions in order to stay in the field.  
                                                 
52 JCC, I, 765, 769-770. 
53 JCC, I, 781-782. Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 137, 148-151, 182-185.  For more on Confederate railroads, see Robert C. Black, III., The Railroads 
of the Confederacy (1952, reprint: Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1998) and George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode 
the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).   
  85
The practice frequently consisted of military commanders acquiring necessary items and 
leaving a promissory note that typically paid little beyond the cost of production.  
Logistical concerns also made it much easier for massive armies to strip clean areas 
within the immediate vicinity of camp rather than have agents fan out and selectively 
appropriate goods.  Such a practice expended far less manpower and man-hours, and the 
army naturally wanted to cut its costs as much as possible and avoid sinking the nation 
into even further debt.    
Impressment, though necessary for the maintenance of troops in the field, created 
a backlash.  One’s personal encounter with a stingy army officer or impressment – or 
accounts of similar misfortunes suffered by friends and family – led many to fear the 
Confederate defenders almost as much as the invading Union blue.  Annoyed citizens 
inundated leaders on the state and national levels with complaints about army officers 
and impressment agents who offered payment well below the market price, thus 
depriving agriculturists of a fair profit and all but guaranteeing further hardship due to 
growing deprivations and inflation.  Another very real problem was an increasing 
proliferation of imposters masquerading as army officers and impressment agents.  These 
men arrived with counterfeit orders and seized goods for their own consumption or 
private enterprise.  Others were even more brazen and little more than robbers, taking 
families’ remaining crumbs at gunpoint while claiming to be Confederate agents.  Not 
surprisingly, there was growing antagonism by many farmers, and thousands balked 
when ordered to supply armies in the field.  With rising inflation, speculation by private 
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citizens soared.  Increasing numbers of Confederate citizens held goods in hopes of 
achieving maximum value once they brought crops to market.54 
The Provisional Congress never proposed significant legislation addressing 
impressments, and the First Congress did not take up the topic until goaded by President 
Davis.  A January 3, 1863 message from Secretary of War Seddon to Davis maintained 
that impressments were essential for the army’s survival, but also emphasized the need 
for implementing safeguards against abuse.55  In Davis’s opening message to the third 
session, he expressed his hopes that 1863 would be the final year of the war and therefore 
did not desire to enact drastic changes in financial policy.   Sacrifices were in order, 
however.  He called for the “adoption of some comprehensive system of finance,” 
including a regulated mode of impressment.56  He urged the Congress for legislation 
contracting the amount of currency passing through Confederate hands and stressed the 
need for “revenue for from the taxation adequate to support the public credit.”57  If 
Congress could enact adequate taxation and remove surplus currency, Davis professed, 
“there is little doubt we shall see our finances restored to sound and satisfactory 
condition.”58 
After receiving Davis’s message, the House immediately tackled the issue of 
impressment.   Virginians Muscoe Garnett and John Goode proposed a resolution of 
inquiry on military confiscations.  In open debate, Garnett expressed his admiration for 
Secretary of War Seddon and his policies but confessed that he “fear[ed] abuses 
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entrenched in the system” of impressment. 59  For two months both houses debated 
impressment, and congressmen proposed a series of bills and amendments.  In the House, 
James Holcombe of Virginia offered a bill that passed by a 52-7 margin on February 17.  
Chief components of his proposal included the institution of a board of “three 
disinterested citizens” from the surrounding community that would preside over disputes 
when impressment agents and property owners could not agree upon a satisfactory price.  
The bill also allowed the army the right to impress slaves for work details, a practice that 
many armies in the field already performed.60  After considering several bills on the 
matter, on March 10 the Senate agreed on a bill that closely mirrored the House bill.  
Two key amendments differed from the House plan, however.  The Senate bill forbade 
the impressment of slaves used for agricultural purposes and granted the army access to 
surplus goods only, not produce necessary for private citizens’ survival.61   
A joint committee of conference met, resolved differences, and agreed on a 
satisfactory bill on March 23.62  When disagreements occurred between the army and 
property holders over goods grown or held for private use, two supposedly disinterested 
local citizens were chosen, one by the agent and one by the owner.  If the two parties still 
could not reach an agreement, a third disinterested citizen rendered a decision that was 
final.  Disputes over goods intended for commercial sale came under the authority of 
state commissioners appointed by the president and state governors.  These 
commissioners could then appoint umpires to arbitrate conflicts over the proper market 
value of commercial goods.  Armies could now legally impress slaves for work details 
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but were required to adhere to state laws or decrees issued by the secretary of war.63  The 
next day saw the resumption of debate in the Senate.  Thomas J. Semmes of Louisiana 
opposed the bill, arguing, “it gave up everything which the Senate had contended for” by 
forcing the government to pay the highest possible market price, a condition benefiting 
speculators and traitors.  Landon Carter Haynes of Tennessee and Benjamin Hill both 
objected to Semmes’ allegations, explaining that the arbitration process for vicinage 
appraisement did not guarantee exorbitant bills owed by the treasury.  In addition, they 
stressed compensation came only to those who took oaths of allegiance and swore that 
they were indeed producers.  An overwhelming majority of the Senate agreed with the 
bill and passed it by a 17-4 margin.64  On March 26, Davis signed the bill into law.65  
 Problems with impressment continued to plague the nation, however.  The March 
26 law only legalized many practices already in place.  With Union advances resulting in 
more conquest and destruction, Confederates operated within shrinking boundaries.  
Instead of lightly gathering resources from wider areas, many military forces again had 
little choice but to comb the immediate vicinity and gather all that was immediately 
accessible.  Rather than surrender or disband due to a lack of provisions, Confederate 
forces continued many of their old habits for supply.  In turn, many Confederate civilians 
became increasingly unable or unwilling to part with their crops and livestock.  For some, 
resistance resulted from soaring inflation and mounting deprivations.  For others, 
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opposition resulted from sagging morale and a loss of confidence in the cause or the 
army’s ability to defend them.66 
 A month after legalizing the army’s impressment of civilians’ goods, Congress 
also passed the tax-in-kind.  The permanent Constitution forbade Congress from 
imposing direct taxes on the population unless the national government obtained a new 
national census.  With the disruptions of warfare making such a venture impossible, 
Congress circumvented the legal restrictions and levied a tax against all farmers and 
livestock producers.  The tax law also resulted from a compromise between the House 
and Senate.  While the House generally supported Memminger’s recommendations for a 
ten percent earned income tax and a one percent property tax, the Senate very strongly 
opposed the treasury secretary’s proposal for land duties.  A committee of conference 
finally yielded satisfactory concessions from both sides, and the compromise measure 
quelled Senate fears that slaves and land would be taxed.67  On April 24, the bill became 
law, implementing a series of occupational and license taxes.  A national income tax also 
went into effect, withholding one percent of all salaried employees’ wages between 
$1000 and $1500.  All salaries higher than $1500 were taxed at two percent rate.  All 
non-fixed incomes from $500 and up were taxed on a sliding scale from five to fifteen 
percent.  The maximum rate applied to all incomes higher than ten thousand dollars.  
Soldiers’ salaries were exempt from taxation.68 
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Most controversial was the requirement that all farmers to set aside 10 percent of 
their harvests and one percent of all livestock not used as draft animals as a federal tax.  
The government’s agricultural requisition plan worked twofold; it called for 
appropriations to bolster funds in the national treasury and provided direct relief for 
armies in the field.  Like conscription and impressment, however, many Confederates 
scoffed at additional demands for sacrifice by the national government.  The regressive 
nature of the agricultural taxes in kind particularly chafed small farmers.  A fraught 
yeoman often made greater struggles submitting his tenth of all produce than a wealthy 
planter required to submit the same percentage of his crop.  Disgruntled southerners grew 
increasingly disaffected; some outwardly defied collection agents and refused 
compliance. 
 The fourth and final gathering of the First Congress convened for a lame duck 
session on December 7, 1863.  Jefferson Davis’s message arrived the next day, 
addressing many aspects of the faltering Confederate economy.  He continued his attack 
on the Union blockade, questioning its legality and the lack of British efforts to end it.  
Because of Great Britain’s inactivity on the diplomatic front, Davis felt he had no choice 
but to recall James Mason, his representative in London.69  He then stressed the urgent 
need for alterations in public finance but maintained, “…the resources of our country are 
so ample and the spirit of our people so devoted to its cause, that they are ready to make 
any necessary contribution.”70  He pleaded for major efforts to curb inflation.  “I need not 
enlarge upon the evil effects of this condition on things,” he wrote.  “They are 
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unfortunately but too apparent.”71  He also vowed “to approve any law levying the 
taxation which you are bound to impose for the defense of the country in any other 
practicable mode which shall distribute the burthen uniformly and impartially on the 
whole property of the people.”72  Complaints about the imbalances of impressment not 
sway Davis, however.  He maintained the necessity for preserving the current mode of 
military seizures and stressed a stabilized currency would remedy the troubles with the 
system.73 
Three major financial directives passed on February 17, 1864, the final day of the 
Confederate Congress.  In Davis’s opening message, he had called for a shift from 
treasury notes to interest-bearing bonds to fund the war effort.74  Congress responded 
with a new funding law that ordered all holders of Confederate treasury notes bearing no 
interest to exchange their old notes for 20-year bonds with a 4 percent rate of return or 
new treasury notes at two-thirds value.75  Inflation was hopelessly out of control, and 
Memminger desperately needed the authorization to contract millions of dollars from the 
Confederate economy.76  The law allowed Memminger such privileges and demanded 
that Confederate citizens east of the Mississippi River surrender their old notes by April 
1.  Residents in the Trans-Mississippi had until July 1 to comply.  Notes denominated at 
one hundred dollars or higher not received before the deadlines were no longer accepted 
for any government debts and were additionally taxed at one-third their value plus an 
additional 10 percent a month until relinquished.  Bills in smaller denominations could 
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continue circulation, but they were now funded at a two-thirds rate until January 1, 1865.  
At this time, they too would become worthless.77 
 A five percent property tax passed the same day.78  Memminger made earlier 
requests for taxation on land and slaves, the two components of the Confederate economy 
previously untouched by Congress.  Davis agreed with Memminger’s appeals.  In his 
opening message to the fourth session, Davis directed Congress to consider untapped 
sources for revenue from the “two-thirds of the entire taxable property in the Confederate 
States . . . land and slaves”.79  Acknowledging that the 1863 tax law unfairly taxed the 
remaining one-third of all Confederate property, he urged Congress for a new statute.  If 
the new ordinance bypassed constitutional requirements for a new census, so be it.  After 
all, no Supreme Court could overturn such a law, and national survival was imperative.80  
Congress did not yield to Davis’s wishes for slave taxes, but they did institute a five 
percent tax on all landed property and a ten percent tax on all precious metals and 
jewelry.  The law also levied additional duties on gold and silver coins, stocks, and other 
tradable commodities.  While the law did not completely satisfy Davis, it did provide a 
new comprehensive means of generating revenue.81  The April 24, 1863 tax act also 
underwent several revisions, increasing the number and amount of occupational taxes 
levied throughout the nation.82 
None of the financial measures passed during the final session of the First 
Congress provided sufficient financial support for the national government and army.  In 
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large part, these breakdowns resulted from Union army advances and a crumbling 
transportation system that made a thorough and equitable collection impossible.  Despite 
the many disappointments associated with Confederate finance and supply, not all efforts 
sustaining the war effort were failures.  Josiah Gorgas labored mightily to make the 
Department of Ordnance the most efficient bureau within the entire War Department.  
Gorgas, with very little oversight by either the executive or the legislative branches, 
began a comprehensive program for Confederate armament.  Soldiers received 
instructions on properly scavenging battlefields for weapons and munitions.  Gorgas 
acquired pipes and church bells by the ton and converted them into cannon balls, guns, 
and bullets.  He formed nitre and mining corps for extracting raw materials and 
established foundries in Selma, Alabama and Columbus, Georgia to produce finished 
materials.  Agents were dispatched to Europe and received ordnance in exchange for 
cotton, employing a fleet of blockade-runners that smuggled in additional munitions, 
gunpowder, and metals.  Confederate armies often went into battle outmanned, hungry, 
and poorly clothed.  But thanks to Gorgas’s efforts, rarely did they face the enemy with a 
shortage of weapons or bullets.83 
 Unfortunately, the efficiency of Josiah Gorgas did not typify southern finance 
and supply.  A lack of economic foresight and a crippling lack of resources devastated the 
Confederate war effort, arguably dooming the nation’s chances for survival from the 
outset.  Managing the country’s treasury overwhelmed Memminger and few of his 
measures bolstered the Confederate financial system.  He mismanaged the nation’s 
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limited specie holdings, did not press for tax legislation during the early stages of war, 
overestimated the economic influence of cotton, and printed so much currency that it 
quickly became worthless.  Jefferson Davis’s near-total lack of fiscal expertise only 
served to exacerbate the administration’s haltering financial policy.84  Congress took little 
initiative in the amelioration of economic woes and typically responded negatively to 
proposals by the president and secretary of the treasury.  An overall deficiency in 
financial expertise in the national legislature hindered progress.   Stubborn allegiance to 
King Cotton persisted throughout the Provisional and First Congresses.  In addition, 
congressmen delayed the implementation of higher taxes and economic sacrifice because 
many believed the war would end shortly.  As victory and an honorable peace became 
increasingly remote prospects, criticism of the war effort mounted.  But just as 
Congress’s criticisms of Davis’s conscription and economic policies came from a 
scattered and amorphous opposition, so would the resistance to the Confederate 
president’s war policies.    
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CHAPTER IV 
“AUDACITY IS THE KEY TO SUCCESS”: 
CONGRESSIONAL CONFLICTS OVER THE WAR EFFORT 
 
 
 
 
 
 Both the Provisional and First Congresses overwhelmingly supported the war and 
desperately hoped that the Confederacy would win the conflict.  All senators and 
representatives wanted independence and abhorred the idea of reunification or 
reconstruction.  They envisioned themselves as the rightful heirs of the American 
Revolution and the true guardians of American ideals.  The Union, on the other hand, was 
in their eyes a region now perverted by abolitionism and Black Republicanism, beliefs 
Southerners deemed antithetical to their (and therefore all right-thinking Americans’) 
way of life. 
 For the men who sat in the Provisional and First Congresses, the only sure means 
for preserving their nation and lifestyles was success on the battlefield.  At first, many 
harbored naïve hopes that a nation of effete Yankees would balk at the prospect of 
bloodshed and strive to avoid conflict altogether.  Once hostilities began, the hope of a 
short and largely bloodless war remained until it became increasingly apparent that the 
Union’s guns shot just as straight and that Billy Yank’s courage was as true as Johnny 
Reb’s.  While the Confederacy did not need to win a majority of its battles in order to win 
the war, its armies certainly needed to endure the ravages inflicted by northern invasion 
and, in turn, exact punishing blows to Federal armies.  Hopes remained high that southern 
forces could withstand the onslaughts of attack and make the price of northern 
campaigning so high that the Union would lose its resolve and end the conflict.   
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 Only the withdrawal of Union troops would ensure the survival of the 
Confederate States of America.  All in the legislative branch sitting first in Montgomery 
and then in Richmond recognized success in battle was the only means to maintain 
independence.  The Confederate Congress stood foursquare behind Jefferson Davis’s 
intentions to drive northern invaders from its home soil.  Davis and the Congress were 
not always in lockstep when considering the planning and implementation of military 
strategy, however.  A number of congressmen complained that Davis was not sufficiently 
aggressive in his choice of tactics.  Others thought he was too aggressive and should 
make greater overtures for peace.  Almost all, at one point or another, complained that 
their home states needed greater defenses and made efforts to secure additional military 
protection.   
Some congressmen, like Henry S. Foote of Tennessee, used the occasional 
criticisms of Davis’s war policy as opportunities for personal attacks against Davis, his 
cabinet members, and his generals.  While few legislators employed similarly 
vituperative lines of attack, conflicts did emerge over Davis’s choices for military 
leadership, particularly his generals.  Many lambasted Braxton Bragg and James 
Pemberton; other generals, such as P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston, saw their 
estimation by Congress vacillate wildly.  Not even the venerable Robert E. Lee escaped 
scrutiny, particularly during the 1862 Maryland campaign.   
Similar critiques of Davis’s cabinet also emerged during the Provisional and First 
Congresses.  Lawmakers in Montgomery and Richmond were especially critical of the 
men who headed the War and Navy Departments.  Judah P. Benjamin and Stephen 
Mallory both became convenient scapegoats for major military setbacks.  While Davis 
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eventually moved Benjamin from the War Department to the State Department, he 
retained Mallory in the Navy for the duration of the war, even as a joint committee 
questioned Mallory’s competence.  By the end of the First Congress, legislators 
concluded a lengthy investigation and absolved Mallory of any wrongdoing.  Although 
the naval secretary remained an unpopular public figure, there was no substantial 
evidence of incompetence by Mallory, and Congress would not press for his removal. 
While opposition to Davis and his war effort in the Provisional and First 
Congresses was not as prevalent as the resistance posed in the Second and final Congress, 
it was present and could be strident.  His antagonists did not coalesce during the 
Confederacy’s first three years of existence, and protests typically came from individual 
members of the legislative branch, not organized factions.  As a result, hostility came 
from a very vocal minority that had limited success deterring the president’s war policy.  
 
●      ●      ● 
 
 War did not come during the first session of the Provisional Congress, which 
convened on February 4 and adjourned on March 16, 1861.  While some congressmen 
may have secretly harbored hopes that the North would allow the secession of the 
original seven Confederate states to stand, the Provisional Congress did implement 
several measures for securing the infant nation’s defense.  With the absence of military 
hostilities, Davis’s relations with the first gathering of Confederate congressmen were 
harmonious, and discussions over defensive measures avoided internecine conflict.  On 
the final day of the first session, the legislature unanimously approved all of Davis’s 
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nominees for military appointment, having already agreed to give preference to men who 
resigned their commissions in the U.S. Army.1 A provisional army was quickly 
established, but concerns over a large standing army, a deeply ingrained fear held by 
most Americans – both in the North and the South, remained.  The Louisianan Duncan 
Kenner’s March 4 amendment to the provisional army bill reflected such sentiments, as it 
mandated “that the president shall call into the service of the Confederate States only so 
many of the troops herein provided for as he may deem the safety of the Confederacy 
may require.”2  With these restrictions in place, Congress passed a bill to create a 12-
month regular army on March 9, 1861, and Davis approved it shortly thereafter.3  At the 
time, many thought war would never come and few envisioned a lengthy conflict.  
 Although solons harbored hopes that war would not occur, official proceedings of 
the first provisional session show a Congress certainly assertive in its dealings with its 
northern adversaries.  Shortly after convening, Congress overwhelmingly endorsed a 
February 15 resolution demanding Union forces vacate Forts Pickens and Sumter.4  
While the lame duck Buchanan administration showed no signs of offering any stern 
resistance to southern secessionists, the Congress had little confidence that the incoming 
Abraham Lincoln would remain passive.  The preliminary buildup of the infant nation’s 
defenses reflected this mistrust.   
 The second session of the Provisional Congress convened on April 29, flush with 
the victory at Fort Sumter.  A May 2 resolution of thanks to P.G.T. Beauregard for 
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gaining control of the stronghold quickly passed.5  A May 3 bill on recognizing the 
existence of war produced more disagreement before passage.  Debates centered over the 
language in the measure; opponents wanted a more strident tone to show Union 
aggression and southern hesitance in the prelude to hostilities.6  The same day, a censure 
of Lincoln and his blockade of the Confederate coastline produced little debate.7 
 Lincoln’s call for 75,000 troops to suppress the rebellion led to the passage of a 
May 8 bill calling for more Confederate troops.  Many congressmen were still reluctant 
to have terms of enlistment lasting longer than 12 months.  While the fears of a large 
standing army gave way to the demands of national survival, the hopes and expectations 
of a short conflict had not.8  During these early and heady days of nation building, 
Congress offered tremendous support for their president’s war measures.  On the final 
day of the session, the Provisional Congress gave unanimous approval for all of Davis’s 
submitted candidates for military appointment.9 
 The Provisional Congress met for its third session in Richmond on July 20.  By 
now, several skirmishes had taken place in Missouri and Virginia.  No major engagement 
had yet occurred, though.  Yet as the Congress convened, sizeable Union and 
Confederate forces maneuvered within striking distance of the Confederate capital.  
Provisional delegates breathlessly awaited news of the ensuing conflict at Manassas 
Junction, Virginia.  After receiving Davis’s July 22 dispatches of the battle, congressmen 
celebrated as jubilantly as their constituents did.10  Many believed the conflict was an 
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American Waterloo.  Southerners hoped the battle that would convince northerners to 
abandon efforts restoring the Union by force.  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed a 
resolution thanking Confederate commanders Joseph E. Johnston, P.G.T. Beauregard, 
and the troops for their efforts.11  
 
●      ●      ● 
 
Davis faced intermittent opposition from a testy minority in Congress following 
the stunning victory at Manassas.  From July 1861 until the conclusion of the First 
Congress’s final session, critics contended that Davis and his subordinates had 
inadequately prepared for war.  A few complained that the president had exploited the 
vicissitudes of war for his own benefit and was determined to establish a military 
despotism.  Conversely, some wanted the implementation of a total war effort.  Several 
congressmen argued that Davis’s strategy was too timid, while others complained that 
Davis was too aggressive once he made the decision to invade Maryland in 1862.   
After the victory at First Manassas, some congressmen and citizens alike 
expressed worries about inadequate Confederate defenses.  On July 31, Davis sent a 
message to Howell Cobb, president of the Provisional Congress, addressing the defense 
of the Mississippi River, in which Davis articulated his concerns over press rumors 
regarding deficiencies of coastal defense.12  These same anxieties prompted Louisianan 
Charles Conrad’s delivery of an August 12 resolution demanding Secretary of War Leroy 
P. Walker report on defensive measures for New Orleans, “in view of a probable attack 
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upon that city at no distant period.”13  Two days later, Walker replied, stressing that the 
city would soon receive adequate fortifications and guns.14  Walker’s message may have 
temporarily placated Louisiana delegates, but the apparent lack of action on the Atlantic 
coast alarmed other congressmen.  On August 31, the final day of the session, Congress 
sent to Davis a resolution seeking information on measures to prevent invasions of North 
Carolina’s coasts.15 
 Davis wanted Missouri and Kentucky admitted into the Confederacy despite the 
lack of majority approval for secession in either state.  On August 3, he recommended 
one million dollars to Missouri for its aid and relief.  Two days later, Congress passed the 
measure.16  On August 3, Congress amended Conrad’s bill for public defense by 
stipulating that men in the Confederate army must remain in service for no less than 12 
months or more than three years.  Although hopes remained strong that the war would be 
brief, the alteration of the bill offers evidence that many in Congress had begun to 
contemplate a prolonged and extensive conflict.  Examination of the bill also offers 
evidence that hopes remained that men from Border States still under the Union flag 
would enter the conflict.  It authorized the secretary of war to provide transportation to 
troops and volunteers from Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, or Missouri.17  
   Missouri’s admission to the Confederacy was not entirely free of congressional 
dissent.  Wiley Pope Harris of Mississippi tried to keep the Missouri relief act secret on 
August 6, because Congress had not yet recognized the state’s rump delegation.18  
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Missouri’s lack of any official measure severing allegiance with the Union clearly 
rankled some congressmen.  On August 16, Josiah Campbell of Mississippi tried to 
amend the bill admitting the state into the Confederacy.  He wanted Missouri excluded 
from admission until she formally seceded.  His amendment wished to remove the 
petition process for statehood from “the properly and legally constituted authorities” to “a 
convention of the people or a majority of the legal voters.”  Few congressmen agreed 
with Campbell’s recommendations, however, and the measure was overwhelmingly 
defeated.19   
 Congress also made overtures Kentucky during the third provisional session.  
Davis signed an August 30 act promising the repelling of invaders from the state.20  The 
next day, Davis sent a message to Congress proposing $1 million in relief to the state.  
His exhortations came late in the session, and Congress did not act at this time, only 
ordering the bill published for further review.21  Both Missouri and Kentucky would 
eventually gain admission into the Confederacy, but Missouri’s entry took months to 
finalize.  The final votes for each state encountered minimal opposition during the fifth 
session of the Provisional Congress.   
Rumors of prisoner abuses by northern captors troubled both the Congress and the 
president for the duration of the war.  After generously praising the efforts of the 
Confederate army during his opening message to the third provisional session, Davis 
stressed his wishes that southern forces continue gentlemanly and civilized conduct in 
war.  He did threaten reciprocity with Union prisoners of war, but only if Confederate 
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soldiers held captive by the Union first suffered mistreatment.22  Congressmen also made 
warnings of possible reciprocity against Union captives. South Carolinian James 
Lawrence Orr’s August 23 resolution threatened retaliation against Union prisoners for 
the capture of Confederate vessels Sumter and Petrel.23  On August 28, Robert Barnwell 
Rhett wanted the injunction of secrecy removed from the alleged hangings of South 
Carolina captives held by Union armies.  Both of these appeals offered evidence of minor 
conflict with the Davis administration, with these very public demands issued in open 
session despite the pleadings of Secretary of War Leroy Walker to keep all military 
matters secret.24  On August 30, Davis relented to congressional pressure and signed an 
act into law authorizing retaliation against Union prisoners of war.  Although he now had 
the legal authority to exact retribution from northern detainees, Davis would never 
sanction reprisals against Federal captives.25 
There were no further notable challenges to Davis’s policy until the first regularly 
elected Congress convened on February 18, 1862, immediately following the final 
adjournment of the provisional legislature.  Virginian Thomas Bocock, unanimously 
chosen as the speaker of the House of Representatives, gave his opening remarks to the 
newly assembled body and wondered aloud if “our new system” could “legitimately 
afford the means to bring the war to successful conclusion?”26  Regardless of the 
differences in politics, Bocock encouraged members of the First Congress to put their 
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present and future conflicts with one another aside.  Glory came only with victory, 
disgrace surely would accompany defeat, he argued.27 
Despite Bocock’s exhortations, Henry S. Foote of Tennessee quickly disregarded 
the speaker’s pleas and soon emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the 
administration’s war policy.  On February 19, he made demands for a committee of 
inquiry to investigate recent military disasters in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Kentucky, in hopes of preventing comparable setbacks in the future.  John Crockett 
of Kentucky wanted Foote’s resolution discussed in secret session, but Foote protested.  
“Secret sessions . . . even now,” Foote argued, “had been productive of much harm.”  
With Foote refusing further consideration in secret session, the House allowed Crockett 
to place Foote’s proposal on the table.28   
The next day, Foote called for the abandonment of the Confederacy’s military 
policy of primarily defensive tactics, insisting Davis and Confederate forces discard such 
an approach “forever.”29  Albert Gallatin Jenkins of Virginia replied that the tone of 
Foote’s resolution implied censure of Davis.  Foote responded by noting that Judge 
Harris of Mississippi, an influential figure in Davis’s home state, also disapproved 
defensive policies.  Only campaigns in the North would exact proper retribution for 
Yankee outrages and end the war, Foote continued.  He further contended that the lack of 
assertiveness already contributed to failures in the West, such as the losses of Forts 
Donelson and Henry.30  Jenkins retorted that only fools philosophized on military 
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matters.31  Given current conditions, Jenkins argued, calls for a more aggressive war 
policy were simply impracticable.  Undeterred, Foote proceeded to attack the competence 
of Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin and Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory, even 
alleging that Mallory did not know if Forts Henry and Donelson were in Kentucky or 
Tennessee.32  He challenged Benjamin to face Congress, “even though he were but a 
pigmy in debate.”33 
Debate over tactics resumed in the House the next day.  Foote opened the 
discussion by stressing that although he questioned Davis’s policies and the very 
competence of secretaries Benjamin and Mallory, he had not censured the actions of 
either P.G.T. Beauregard or the Provisional Congress.34  William Boyce of South 
Carolina continued the barrage of criticism against Davis.  He grumbled, “We should 
have aimed at an offensive warfare.”  For Boyce, a guarded approach towards 
engagement simply was inadequate.  “Audacity!  Audacity!  Audacity! is the key to 
success,” he cried.35  Napoleon and Frederick the Great did not wait and allow their 
enemies to dictate the terms of battle, he argued.  Meanwhile, the armies of the 
Confederacy were skittish and immobile, in large part to his claim that “inactivity had 
been one of the curses of the South.”36  Boyce then contended the North, on the other 
hand, showed a willingness to jettison incapable leaders and administrators.  He closed 
his monologue by stating that even Albert Gallatin Jenkins, a noted ally of the Davis 
administration, previously complained about Davis’s lack of a plan for war.37 
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Jenkins responded to Boyce’s charges, insisting that Davis did indeed have a 
coherent course of action but simply had not laid out his plans for congressional 
perusal.38  Boyce retorted that there was no plan of strategy.  He went on to declare that 
the men who must and should formulate a policy were P.G.T. Beauregard and Robert 
Toombs.  In addition, he pressed for congressional appointment of a commander in chief 
of the army, despite constitutional provisions mandating that the president possessed such 
powers.39  Following William Machen of Kentucky’s speech voicing his opposition of a 
new policy of offense and Foote’s scoffing at allegations that he advocated usurpation, 
Robert Trippe of Georgia offered a compromise resolution calling for an offensive-
defensive policy – one comparable to the strategy eventually employed by Davis.40  Foote 
answered that he refused to accept such a policy if it endorsed secretaries Benjamin or 
Mallory.  Trippe countered that the resolution endorsed the nation as whole, not 
individuals.  Such explanations did not satisfy Foote, who maintained his refusal to 
support any measures endorsing the administration.41  
Not all discussions of the war effort were so divisive during the First Congress’s 
opening session.  An overwhelming majority of Davis’s military appointments during the 
session enjoyed swift passage.  Excluding the lingering controversy surrounding Davis’s 
list of the top five generals in the Confederacy, Congress raised few objections to the 
president’s recommendations for appointment and promotion.42  Although the first 
dispatches from the engagement at Shiloh were often fragmentary and contradictory, 
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even leading to an April 8 joint resolution praising the army’s “glorious victory,” finger 
pointing over news of the eventual defeat did not come – yet.43  By session’s end, few 
solons had the initial tenacity expressed by Foote or Boyce when it came to matters 
regarding the war effort.  On April 21, the final day of the first session, Reuben Davis 
called a suspension of the rules for a resolution stipulating that Jefferson Davis order 
Joseph E. Johnston and John B. Magruder “to make an immediate attack on the enemy on 
the Peninsula” at Yorktown, Virginia.  With most ready to return to their constituencies, 
the House defeated Davis’s proposal by a 57-1 vote.44 
Notwithstanding the increasingly public criticism leveled at the president, 
Congress was resolute in its pursuit of victory.  Forceful examples of this determination 
came with numerous patriotic resolutions swiftly passed through both houses, for the 
language clearly intended to boost the morale of the army and citizenry.  Senator William 
Elliot Simms of Kentucky had a February 26 resolution demanding the Confederacy fight 
until the nation expended “the last man and the last dollar.”45  On March 3, the House 
unanimously passed Alabaman John Perkins Ralls’s resolution, which insisted the 
Confederacy “never politically affiliate with a people who are guilty of an invasion of 
their soil and the butchery of their citizens.”46  Despite the obvious rancor that appeared 
during the initial session of the First Congress, the legislative branch retained its resolve 
to win the war and Davis maintained overwhelming support within the legislature. 
By the time the second session of the First Congress gathered on August 18, New 
Orleans and Memphis had fallen into Union hands, and Confederate forces had retreated 
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from Corinth, Mississippi.  The southern foothold on the West was slipping.  Despite 
these setbacks, hope remained.  Federal General George McClellan and his Army of the 
Potomac were turned back on the Peninsula, following Lee’s victory in the Seven Days’ 
campaign.  As soon as the House of Representatives gathered, Foote introduced a 
multitude of bills calling for retaliation against Union prisoners of war.  In addition, he 
introduced a resolution calling for no secret sessions in the House unless a majority 
present endorsed it.  He blasted congressional protocol, which dictated that all matters 
pertaining to defensive measures be determined in secret, saying it was a means “to 
resolve this august body into a dark political enclave.”  He “would call it nothing else” 
and went to proclaim it was pointless to hide matters in secret session, since Lincoln and 
his spies would uncover Confederate military policies anyway.47  Most congressmen did 
not agree and killed his proposals the next day.48  Additional measures to protect military 
secrecy came when the House also rejected Joseph a proposal requiring the secretary of 
war to make public all news and dispatches from battles.49 
Calls for a more aggressive presidential war policy renewed.  On August 25, 
Foote introduced a resolution calling for an aggressive war of invasion immediately.  He 
then amended the resolution on August 27, promising reciprocity with peaceful states in 
the Northwest.50  Shortly after Foote’s abortive effort to depose Mallory from the naval 
department, members of the House agreed to table his resolution on future conduct of the 
war.  Foote was not alone with calls for aggressive warfare.  Other calls for invasion 
came from Joseph Heiskell of Tennessee, who offered a resolution beseeching 
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Confederate forces to take Union hostages.  He claimed that the kidnap and ransom of 
northerners would ensure the safe treatment of Confederate prisoners of war.  Heiskell 
could not enlist adequate support in the House, and he quickly withdrew the measure 
from consideration.51 
When Confederate invasion of Union territory finally did come, some legislators 
expressed their opposition to Lee’s campaign into Maryland.  During a September 12 
consideration of a House resolution praising Robert E. Lee for his actions at the Second 
Battle of Manassas, James Lyons of Virginia petitioned for alterations.  He did not want 
any mention or encouragement of invasion in the decree.  William Porcher Miles 
chastised Lyons, claiming that now was not the time for hesitation.  Lyons, in turn, 
professed his support for a campaign into Maryland, a slave state that very well might 
have seceded from the Union had Lincoln not suspended the writ of habeas corpus there a 
year and half earlier.  He did not endorse an invasion into Pennsylvania, however.52   
Aggressive warfare was exactly what the nation needed, Miles argued.  “[I wish] 
every branch of government to understand that this Congress does not think the war has 
been hitherto waged upon a mode best calculated to bring it to a speedy close,” he 
added.53  Skeptical of the current mode of operations, Lyons asked Miles if the army 
could safely venture into the heart of the North.  “Yes,” Miles replied.  If Davis would 
simply give Stonewall Jackson “half of our present army,” he “would drive the entire 
600,000 of the North before him.”54   
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Lyons’s amendment lost 29-61, but this did not deter Robert Hardy Smith of 
Alabama from voicing his opposition of advances into enemy territory.  He then 
speculated that the current campaign was merely a result of Davis’s yielding to public 
clamor.  Foote disagreed and professed his delight with a newly found aggressive policy.  
Ethelbert Barksdale scoffed at Smith’s skepticism.  He further opined that Congress 
should not serve as a council of war.  While William Machen of Kentucky approved of 
the campaign, he differed from Barksdale’s insistence that Congress remain silent on 
tactics.  He even suggested Confederate forces capture and ransom the city of Cincinnati 
before suing for peace.55  
On September 16, the day before the battle at Antietam, Foote presented a joint 
resolution to the House requesting envoys negotiate with the Lincoln administration for 
terms of a “just and honorable peace,” even though he confessed he had little confidence 
in Lincoln or his honor.56  Even so, he was optimistic that the looming presence of 
Confederate forces would trigger a capitulation by Lincoln, possibly even resulting in the 
ouster of the hated Union president and “his Myrmidons.”57    
If Lincoln fit the Homeric role of a greedy and domineering Agamemnon, then 
Foote and Jefferson Davis’s actions over the next two days certainly draw comparisons to 
a blindly optimistic Priam oblivious to impending disaster.  Foote extolled the Army of 
Northern Virginia as “completely victorious.” He maintained that Lee or Stonewall 
Jackson’s presence in the field would leave the Union no choice but surrender.  Even 
though the House tabled his resolution, both executive and legislative branches were 
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supremely confident that Lee could bring the Confederacy a swift victory.58  The next 
day, well before receiving the final dispatches from Antietam, Davis ordered September 
18 as a day of thanksgiving for military victories.59  Lee’s army had instead fought to 
incredibly costly draw and very could have been crushed by McClellan if the Union 
commander had been more aggressive in his tactics and pursuit.  Hopes for a swift and 
peaceful resolution crumbled. 
Shortly after Antietam, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which 
promised the liberation of all slaves still held behind Confederate lines on January 1, 
1863.  These words were anathema to millions of Confederates.  On September 29, 
senators John Clark, Gustavus Henry, and James Phelan advocated that Confederate 
forces fight under the black flag for the duration of the war.  Clark even proposed making 
every Confederate citizen a soldier.  In his eyes, such a course was the only adequate 
means for exacting vengeance.60  A majority of the Senate agreed with Thomas 
Semmes’s suggested retaliations, which included hard labor for Union prisoners of war 
and execution for anyone serving with Negro troops.  A sizeable minority supported 
James Phelan’s suggestions, however.  He urged for a war of extermination against all 
invaders of Confederate soil.  Equally strident was Alabama representative William 
Chilton’s resolution calling for the hanging of all Union officers captured after January 1, 
1863.61  Although Lincoln’s decree certainly angered Davis, neither he nor most 
congressmen could condone such Draconian practices.62 
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Despite the intermittent criticism of the president’s subordinates, little direct 
opposition to Davis or his initiatives resulted during the third session of the First 
Congress.  The only disagreement of note came when Davis and Congress clashed over a 
bill providing artillery for South Carolina’s coastal defense.  The House sent the finalized 
bill to Davis on March 21, even though Reuben Davis argued that the bill was a 
discriminatory bill, providing “unnecessary interference” and a “bad precedent.”63  On 
April 1, Davis returned the vetoed bill “to increase the strength and efficiency of heavy 
artillery for sea coast defense.”  His accompanying message pointed his objections to the 
proposal, which centered primarily on the inequity of granting South Carolina federal 
artillery and not other states as well.  Ever the constitutionalist, Davis did not want to 
establish a precedent for legislation that provided special privileges or denied equal rights 
to all states.64  Undeterred, the Senate overrode a Davis veto for the first time on April 4.  
Senators passed the measure by an 18-5 vote and sent it to the House for consideration.65 
The House contemplated the artillery bill veto on April 7.  William Porcher Miles 
opened discussions, claiming that he respected his president and did not wish to be 
antagonistic.  Even so, Miles “was not willing, on a purely military question, to defer 
entirely to [Davis’s] views over those of other high military authorities.”66  Reuben Davis 
noted the rift between Davis and P.G.T. Beauregard over the matter.  He posited that 
Beauregard failed “in his application to the president respecting the regiment at 
Charleston, [and therefore] had appealed to Congress.”67  A vote for an overturn denoted 
complicity with Beauregard’s scheming, he argued.  An overwhelming majority of the 
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House agreed with Reuben Davis’s line of reasoning.  The artillery bill lost by a 22 to 59 
vote, and the House upheld the president’s veto.68 
No further serious criticism of Davis’s tactics materialized during the third 
session.  But there was sporadic disapproval of the president’s war policy shortly after 
Congress convened for a final, lame duck session on December 8, 1863.  In his opening 
message, Davis expressed his wishes that Congress had assembled at an earlier date, 
given the recent military disasters at Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Port Hudson, and 
Missionary Ridge.69  Although Union forces decisively crushed the Confederacy’s 
western defenses during the intersession, Davis downplayed the collapse publicly.  
“Detachments of troops and active bodies of partisans kept up so effective a war on the 
Mississippi River as practically to destroy its value as an avenue of commerce,” he 
argued.70  He also gave a mild assessment of the loss at Gettysburg, claiming that it was 
only a temporary setback.  He was not so forgiving in his evaluation of the surrender in 
the Cumberland Gap.  If “misconduct by the troops” had not plagued the army, disaster 
would have been avoided.71  Despite the disastrous turn of events, Davis remained 
positive.  In order to secure victory, the president urged the Congress for a law enrolling 
all draft-aged men in the army and then making exemptions and work details when 
necessary.72  
Reactions to Davis’s December 8 message elicited mixed reactions by solons.  
The next day, Foote protested the president’s comments on Chattanooga, contending that 
Davis claimed that the Army of Tennessee had a “want of valor.” Instead, he blamed the 
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loss on Braxton Bragg, whom Davis kept in command despite grumblings by Bragg’s 
subordinates.73  Davis’s visits to western commands brought forth no change in 
leadership, and “they had only been productive of disaster.”74  Foote then alleged that 
Davis had remarked that the Army of Tennessee’s primary hindrance came not from 
inadequate leadership, but from a want of valor.  This unfounded charge led to another 
audacious statement, for he then “charged the president with gross misconduct in 
retaining his favorites in office, with partialities and prejudices, which, if persisted in 
longer, will prove fatal to our cause.”75  On December 10, members of the Senate offered 
highly divergent measures in response to Davis’s remarks.  Albert Gallatin Brown of 
Mississippi presented a resolution that, if passed, would have placed the nation on a total 
war footing by placing all draft-aged men under arms.  Many senators recoiled at 
Brown’s proposal, just as they shrank bank from Herschel Johnson’s bill calling for a 
limit to cabinet officials’ terms in office.  The Senate laid both proposals on the table and 
ordered them printed for further review.  There was no significant action subsequently 
taken on either measure, however.76 
On December 29, Foote’s criticism of Davis’s policies culminated with a plea for 
a military dictatorship.  Foote did not endorse Davis as the man for such a role, however.  
During a long-winded attack on the president’s policies, which included more expansive 
conscription methods and the elimination of officer elections,  Foote shrilly commented 
that Davis’s guiding principles on defense “would have the inevitable effect of utterly 
destroying state rights and state sovereignty, and of establishing a huge and 
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overwhelming military despotism, beneath which all the muniments of civil freedom will 
be crushed into utter extinction.”77  For Foote, the only man worthy of military 
dictatorship was Lee, whom the Tennessee representative continued to champion for the 
remainder of the day’s proceedings.78  
Colleagues did not take Foote’s cries for a military government headed by Lee 
seriously, but they did pause from exhaustive disputes over the revision of draft 
exemption laws and contemplated resolutions calling for a redoubling of defenses.  The 
House considered a joint resolution calling for a total and unyielding war effort on 
January 4, 1864.  John Goode of Virginia argued for the necessity of the resolution, 
arguing it showed the world that Congress had renewed confidence in their cause.   Such 
was necessary for the prevention of Yankee “subjugation and enslavement.”79  On 
January 8, Senator Albert Gallatin Brown introduced a resolution demanding that the 
nation’s armies “prosecute the war with the utmost vigor.”80  One week later, an 
impatient Senator Herschel Johnson made explicit demands for a more vigorous defense.  
On January 15, he proposed President Davis “call out at the proper time, for four months, 
the entire population of the South capable of bearing arms.”  Most senators could not 
fathom such immoderate methods of defense, however, and they referred Johnson’s 
request to a committee.81  
 Congress did little to alter Davis’s war policies.  The demands of Davis’s generals 
and the advances made by invading enemy forces had a far greater impact on the 
president’s strategy than did the occasional long-winded diatribe issued forth on the 
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House or Senate floor.  The paucity of open criticism in the Provisional and First 
Congress indicates that most congressmen approved of their president’s lines of attack, or 
that they believed there were no viable alternative plans of defense.  Wartime congresses 
traditionally have difficulty distinguishing themselves on military matters, and the 
Confederate Congress was no different.  With the life of the nation hanging in the 
balance, nearly all legislators considered any public denigration of the men or methods 
employed to secure the Confederacy’s survival treasonous.  Most gave Davis’s critics 
little credence and a good number of them maintained their trust in the president.82 
 
●      ●      ● 
 
As war progressed, Congress did not continue to grant almost instantaneous 
approval to Davis’s military appointments.  Though becoming more critical, Congress 
still generally gave the president what he wanted.  Objections and delays still came, 
however.  During the third provisional session, Congress did not grant blanket approval 
for Davis’s proposals.  Politicians such as Louis T. Wigfall, Howell and T.R.R. Cobb, 
and Stephen F. Hale received their commissions, but no one else on the listing did during 
the final days of the third session.  The remainder of Davis’s list was referred to the 
Committee of Military Affairs for further review.83  On August 31, Colin McRae, with 
William Avery’s encouragement, laid a resolution on the table, which would have 
allowed Davis to consolidate or divide skeleton regiments.84  The only other 
appointments granted during the third session came from Davis’s list of five full generals, 
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listed in order of seniority.  Congress confirmed the order on the last day of the session, 
August 31.  According to the measure passed, Samuel Cooper was the most senior officer 
in the Confederate army, followed in order by Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, 
Joseph E. Johnston, and P.G.T. Beauregard.  Joseph E. Johnston fumed at his placement, 
contending that he was the most senior officer in the U.S. Army.  Thus began his feud 
with the commander in chief.85 
Robert Barnwell Rhett voiced his discontent with the budding controversy with a 
November 25 resolution challenging the legality of Davis’s appointments of major 
generals.86  Four days later, the judicial committee determined that Davis could indeed 
make such appointments.  Such proclamations still did not satisfy all members of 
Congress, however.  Wiley Pope Harris issued a resolution demanding that Davis report 
to the Congress which law allowed him this right.87  Although most congressmen may 
have accepted the findings of the judicial committee, there were enough disgruntled 
legislators present to successfully persuade the Congress not to act immediately on 
Davis’s list of military appointments delivered that day.  Instead of offering the swift and 
blanket approval typical of prior requests, Congress referred the listing to the Committee 
on Military Affairs.  On December 2, another round of prospective military appointments 
also languished in committee with no further action taken.88  Three days later, Davis sent 
forth yet another list of military appointments and requested a withdrawal of the previous 
directory of candidates because Congress had not yet acted upon it.  Robert Barnwell 
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Rhett, normally an anti-administration legislator, complied with Davis’s request this time 
and even had Harris’s objection to the Committee on the Judiciary tabled.89   
Although Davis’s choices for generals stood, he would never again enjoy the 
speedy approval of military appointments that he received during the first four sessions of 
the Provisional Congress.90  The mounting animosity between Davis and such 
commanders as Johnston and Beauregard certainly influenced the actions of solons who 
championed the officers for reasons both personal and political.  A growing anxiety over 
the length of the war also influenced other congressmen.  Although hopes remained high 
that the war would soon end, Union forces showed no signs of making a swift and sudden 
retreat.  Naturally, some congressmen became increasingly cautious in their endorsement 
of potential appointees in the armed forces.  If the president’s previous recommendations 
for military leadership could not vanquish the northern invaders, would the newest batch 
of candidates prove any more capable?   
Several key conflicts over military appointments would occur during the second 
session of the First Congress.  Several newly arrived members of the First Congress 
grumbled about the legality of army and navy appointments made by Davis and the 
Provisional Congress.  Once Davis received word that some legislators wanted military 
officers already in service subject to a new confirmation process, he sent a message to the 
Senate stressing that such a process was too costly and legally unnecessary.  No serious 
challenges to Davis’s military appointments made during the first year of the war 
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subsequently materialized.91  Yet Congress could not sidestep serious disagreements 
about future appointments or the process of confirmation and nomination.  Senator 
William Lowndes Yancey brought forth a bill on September 22, requesting that Davis 
make proportional appointments of brigadier generals from each state.  Although the 
Senate Military Committee recommended against its passage, Yancey pressed forward, 
noting a disproportionate number of generals from Virginia.  He argued Davis’s 
preference for officers from the Old Dominion produced great dissatisfaction amongst his 
Alabama constituents and argued other states surely felt the same.  Benjamin Hill of 
Georgia disagreed, citing Yancey’s bill violated the Constitution.  Congress could only 
advise the President, he argued.  Besides, Virginia produced Lee and Stonewall Jackson.  
Hill freely admitted that Georgia had no equals.  The majority of those in the Senate 
undoubtedly agreed and quickly defeated Yancey’s proposal.92  
Controversies over individual nominees also resulted.  President Davis 
recommended his nephew, Joseph R. Davis, for the rank of brigadier general.  The Senate 
initially defeated the nomination by an 11 to 6 vote on October 3.93  When the Senate 
reconsidered the proposal on October 8, both James Lawrence Orr and William Yancey 
called a renewal of open proceedings or adjournment, hoping to kill deliberations on the 
matter.  This time, however, a majority of Senators present approved the nomination, 
passing it a 13 to 6 count.94  The Senate also rejected John Pemberton’s initial nomination 
as lieutenant general.  While his very public clashes with Georgia and South Carolina 
officials in the spring and summer of 1862 hurt his prospects for advancement, his 
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Pennsylvania roots certainly did not help.  Even so, the Senate did reconsider his 
nomination and granted the promotion on October 13, the session’s final day.95   
General Braxton Bragg was one of Davis’s most controversial military 
appointments, and some congressmen made abortive efforts for his reassignment or 
dismissal.  By late summer of 1862, rumors circulated throughout Richmond and the rest 
of nation alleging Bragg authorized the executions of soldiers under his command for 
misconduct.  On September 8, James Lawrence Orr launched an inquiry of the matter on 
the Senate floor.  Despite Henry Burnett’s efforts to confine the matter to secret session, 
Orr succeeded in keeping the issue in the open forum.96  On September 12, John Clark of 
Missouri defended the president’s silence on the matter, noting that if Davis acted on 
every charge or rumor pertaining to Confederate soldiers, “he would very soon have no 
officers at all.”97  Louis T. Wigfall scoffed at fears of a burgeoning military despotism 
and insisted that the Senate could not legally regulate conduct of armies in the field.  
Robert M.T. Hunter reiterated Wigfall’s sentiments, stressing that Congress could request 
information from the president, but it could not remove generals from the ranks.  He then 
expressed his regrets that the debate was not held in secret.98    
 Despite these clearly defined restrictions, Orr insisted on renewing debate on 
September 13, arguing, “usurpation always had small beginnings.”99  In response, 
Wigfall maintained that soldiers were “decitizened” and the Congress was best served by 
leaving the military code of justice alone.100  On September 15, Jefferson Davis finally 
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broke his silence on the issue.  He insisted he had “received no authentic information in 
relation to any such transaction . . .”101   
Bragg earned a reprieve from congressional scrutiny, albeit a very brief one.  
Following his failures in the Kentucky campaign, he would once again raise the ire of 
both houses.  Foote confessed he opposed the operation in Kentucky and questioned 
Bragg’s competence until Joseph E. Johnston wrote him, explaining the necessity of the 
operation.  With his doubts vanquished, the Tennessee congressmen endorsed the 
measure.  Other members of the House voiced their opposition to Bragg’s tactics or the 
campaign itself.  George Hodge of Kentucky refused to cast a vote because of the heavy 
losses suffered during the second day’s fighting.  James Lyons of Virginia opposed the 
resolution because he opposed the army’s advancement into Kentucky.102  That same day, 
Senator Henry Burnett of Kentucky issued a resolution mandating that Bragg provide 
copies of all of his battle reports from the abortive campaign.103  This discussion 
dissolved with no repercussions.  In fact, in February 1863, Congress passed a resolution 
of thanks for Bragg’s efforts at Murfreesboro by a 78 to 4 vote.104  
Although Davis’s critics delayed or blocked the occasional military nominee, 
there was no structure to the opposition.  Objections typically from an isolated few who 
thirsted for greater input into the selection or removal of officers, particularly 
controversial generals.  While some congressmen may have resented their subservient 
role to Davis during a time of war, most willingly deferred to their more experienced 
commander in chief.   
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●      ●      ● 
 
The unfocused nature of attacks against Davis’s war policies and his choices for 
military appointments also typified many of the attacks against the men who headed the 
Navy and the War Department.  Although Judah P. Benjamin became an increasingly 
unpopular figure towards the end of his tenure as secretary of war, Congress never 
coalesced in its criticisms of Benjamin and had little influence in securing his ouster from 
office.  Likewise, much of the opposition posed against naval secretary Stephen Mallory 
was disparate before Congress eventually agreed to form a joint commission and 
investigated Mallory for misconduct in office.  After a lengthy inquiry, Congress 
eventually cleared Mallory of any wrongdoing.  Although criticism of both men often 
was vituperative, it was usually unfocused and ineffectual.  Most in Congress failed to 
recognize justifiable cause for removing either man from office, ignoring the calls made 
by a strident minority.    
Judah P. Benjamin, who served as the Confederacy’s attorney general, secretary 
of war, and secretary of state, became the one of the most controversial and reviled 
members of Davis’s cabinet.  During the formative months of the Confederacy, however, 
Congress swiftly approved Benjamin’s nomination as the first attorney general, a post he 
held for seven months.  Following the retirement of the first secretary of war, Leroy Pope 
Walker of Alabama, Benjamin then became interim head of the War Department.  The 
Senate granted him unanimous approval when Davis nominated him as the new secretary 
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of war on November 21.105  Although Benjamin’s Jewish heritage and playfully aloof 
personality made him a decidedly unpopular figure in most of Richmond’s social circles, 
the Congress initially regarded the Louisianan as a more capable administrator.  While 
many in Montgomery and Richmond may have disliked Benjamin on a personal basis, 
few congressmen openly criticized him during the first year of the war.  The former U.S. 
senator was one of Davis’s closest advisors and had already served the president as an 
informal military consultant for most of the year.  Davis was still highly popular amongst 
most congressmen and their constituents, and Congress trusted Davis’s judgment.     
But the political goodwill between the new secretary of war and Congress was 
short-lived.  Military disasters occurred at Fort Henry, Roanoke Island, and Fort 
Donelson within a week and a half in February 1862, and Benjamin became an 
increasingly popular object of criticism for many in Congress.  Shortly thereafter, a 
venomous but highly unfocused attack on Benjamin began. 
The inaugurations of Davis and Stephens as the regularly elected president and 
vice-president came on February 22, 1862.  Although most congressmen expected a light 
workday in lieu of the inaugural festivities, Henry S. Foote fully intended for the House 
to scrutinize the president’s military policies.  He called for an investigative committee, 
with a member from each state, which would analyze all available data on defensive 
measures undertaken by Secretary of War Benjamin.  Irritated by Foote’s antics, William 
Smith of Virginia delayed further action and had the proposal laid on the table.106  Foote 
again made his annoyance with the administration known on February 25.  During 
discussions on a resolution requesting that the House grant General Joseph E. Johnston as 
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seat on the floor, Foote proffered an amendment calling for a rule akin to one in British 
Parliament.  The proposed law mandated that a cabinet member who received a vote of 
condemnation or no confidence would resign from his post.  Given Foote’s comments on 
the floor only days earlier, he clearly intended for Benjamin’s ouster.  When William 
Smith asked Foote if President Davis also stood at the mercy of the minority, Foote shot 
back that the king or queen was never voted out.107  Antiquated British decrees evidently 
did not satisfy Foote.  On February 26, he called for the implementation of an ancient 
Roman custom that removed military generals after misfortune and disaster.  Roger Pryor 
of Virginia reminded Foote that the Confederate Constitution already gave Davis, as 
commander in chief, that very right.  Once again, Foote’s recommendation was tabled.108 
 Even if Foote’s antics are disregarded, actions in Congress showed that popular 
support for Judah P. Benjamin as secretary of war was clearly slipping.  On February 26, 
Clement C. Clay offered a curiously timed supplemental War Department bill.  Clay’s 
measure stated that any officer appointed secretary of war would lose the rank already 
held, but would only relinquish his current military salary.  While Clay never openly 
called for Benjamin’s ouster from the War Department, the timing and tone of the bill 
certainly was suspect.109  Equally questionable was Charles Conrad’s motives when he 
introduced a February 27 resolution in the House of Representatives calling for an 
additional Department of War.  He expressed his hopes that the new department would 
separate administrative and field operations, but he withdrew the measure form 
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consideration when William Porcher Miles presented his bill calling for a new 
commander in chief of the army.110   
 Foote, Clay, and Conrad all wanted Benjamin out, but so far there was no 
coordinated effort to remove him.  Up to now, these men had only presented divergent 
plans for his removal, and their measures only garnered minimal support in Congress.  
Even so, public criticism of Benjamin mounted and cries for his ouster from the War 
Department grew thunderous.  Although Davis realized the political necessity for 
removing the Louisianan from his post, he liked Benjamin personally and, even more 
importantly, trusted his counsel.  The president decided to reshuffle his cabinet in order to 
retain Benjamin’s presence in his official family.  On March 18, Davis submitted a new 
cabinet list to the Senate, which named George Randolph as secretary of war and Judah 
P. Benjamin as secretary of state.  Senator James Lawrence Orr of South Carolina 
objected to Benjamin’s placement in the State Department, but Davis’s recommendations 
pleased the rest of the Senate, and it confirmed the new appointments.  Since Confederate 
law mandated that Davis submit a list of his entire cabinet anytime that changes were 
made, Stephen Mallory’s post as secretary of the navy came up for renewal.  Orr tried to 
place Mallory’s nomination on the table, but again his efforts to block a Davis 
appointment failed.  Davis’s changes satisfied an overwhelming majority of 
congressmen; even Foote expressed his approval of the new cabinet.111 
 Though Davis enjoyed the support of a congressional majority for most military 
issues, such as the suspension of habeas corpus and the first conscription law in 
American history, attacks against the president and his subordinates continued throughout 
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the First Congress’s initial session.  A March 22 joint resolution on humanitarian relief 
for Confederate prisoners of war triggered debate when Foote offered an amendment 
limiting the secretary of war’s authority.  Despite the disapproval of many present, Foote 
insisted the amendment remain, as he claimed that he merely wanted to curb George 
Randolph from accumulating “unrestricted power.”  After flatly rejecting his amendment, 
Congress passed the resolution.112  With Benjamin gone, few in Congress wished to 
follow Foote’s continued attacks on the war department.  Although some remained leery 
of subsequent heads of the War Department, the First Congress offered little open 
criticism of George Randolph or James Seddon.113 
Attacks against naval secretary Stephen Mallory were prolonged and more 
coordinated.  During the first year of the Confederacy’s existence, however, Congress 
refrained from attacking Mallory’s performance.  After a somewhat shaky confirmation 
process (the Floridian was the only member of Davis’s first cabinet who did not receive a 
unanimous confirmation), both he and Davis received scant congressional opposition as 
they struggled with the buildup of the nation’s naval fleet and coastal defense.  These 
harmonious relations would prove short-lived.  The Union’s capture of New Orleans in 
April 1862 irreparably shattered many congressmen’s confidence in Mallory, and attacks 
against the beleaguered official increased in frequency and vindictiveness.  On August 
20, 1862, Charles Conrad of Louisiana introduced a resolution calling for the abolition of 
the office of secretary of the navy.  While the Louisianan’s measure almost undoubtedly 
was motivated by the recent fall of New Orleans, Mallory believed Conrad’s hostility 
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resulted from personal rather than public concerns.  Conrad had sizeable holdings on the 
North Carolina coast, which he lost to the Federals in the course of General Ambrose 
Burnside’s expedition.  Even so, the House decided to send the bill to the Committee on 
Military Affairs.114   
The next day, Henry S. Foote renewed the attack on Mallory during discussions 
on a series of resolutions of thanks for the Confederate victories at Seven Pines and 
Chickahominy.  Although it is doubtful that the secretary of the navy had any influence 
whatsoever on these army engagements, such details did not prevent Foote from offering 
an amendment to the resolution of thanks calling for Mallory ’s ouster from the cabinet.  
Given the contrary nature of Foote’s amendment, the House defeated it by a 23 to 44 
vote.115  
Undeterred, Foote attempted a revival of his failed effort to adopt British 
Parliamentary customs in the Confederate Congress.  Impatient that Davis would not fire 
Mallory for the fall of New Orleans, the irascible Tennessean decided to take matters in 
his own hands.  On August 27, he introduced a resolution stating, “that the honorable 
S.R. Mallory, secretary of the navy, does not possess the confidence of Congress or the 
country.”116  While Foote’s proposal did not pass, the House was unsatisfied with the 
Department of the Navy’s performance.  Only when Ethelbert Barksdale offered to 
conduct a full investigation of the naval department did the House agree to lay Foote’s 
resolution on the table.  Even so, enmity towards Mallory for his perceived lack of 
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preparation of New Orleans’ defenses was high; the agreement to kill Foote’s resolution 
came by a 47-41 vote.117 
George Washington Jones of Tennessee and Hines Holt of Georgia thought 
continuing the investigation of Mallory would establish a dangerous precedent.  Hoping 
to end the matter, they presented a resolution asserting “that if members do not cease 
their condemnations of government officials and go to work upon the measures of reform 
demanded by the country, history would record that this was the most inefficient branch 
of government existing in this revolution.”118  Such exhortations did not deter the Senate 
from tackling the controversy on August 28.  Henry Burnett of Kentucky and Thomas 
Semmes both wanted to bring Mallory up on impeachment charges.  Louis T. Wigfall, 
who was still friendly with Davis at the time, reminded his colleagues that only the House 
could impeach the naval secretary.  The Senate, on the other hand, could only preside 
over the proceedings.  Growing impatient with the matter and anxious to save time and 
money, Wigfall issued a challenge to his colleagues.  If anyone had proof of any 
improprieties by Mallory, he demanded that they come forward now and lay out the facts.  
Albert Gallatin Brown agreed with Wigfall’s assertions, commenting that this episode 
was merely the result of overwhelming public clamor for action.  The president was not 
an idiot, he cried.  Had there been any truth to the rumors, Davis already would have 
dismissed Mallory.119  Robert Woodward Barnwell agreed.  He argued that a potential 
impeachment trial or public inquiry of the Navy would “expose to our enemies schemes 
in the past and future, which should be kept from their knowledge.”120   
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Mallory escaped impeachment when both houses agreed to form a joint 
committee investigating Mallory’s conduct.  Although both the House and Senate 
delegations had members who were fierce critics of Mallory, others were moderates or 
ardent supporters of the besieged secretary.121  In the end, cooler heads prevailed, if only 
for the duration of the session.  From August 29 until October 13, the final day of the 
second session, Congress issued no further calls for punitive action against him.  
 Shortly after convening for the third session, however, senators continued their 
attack on Mallory.  On January 20, William Yancey introduced a bill “to regulate the 
action of the Secretary of the Navy upon the decisions of naval general courts martial.”122  
He argued Mallory attempted to try naval surgeon A.S. Garnett twice for the same 
offense, thus necessitating the measure.  Augustus Maxwell of Florida bristled at 
Yancey’s charges and accused the Alabama senator of insufficient research on the matter.  
He opined that Yancey merely wished to smear Mallory in public.  Reuben Brown, 
Benjamin Hill, and James Lawrence Orr pushed for the bill’s referral to committee and 
succeeded.123  Maxwell would not remain silent on the issue, however.  He then 
demanded the presentation of naval court martial reports in question before the Senate.  
Before withdrawing his resolution, Maxwell argued that Yancey had publicly assailed 
Mallory’s reputation; he wanted verifiable evidence presented on the issue before 
congressmen made any further accusations.124 
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Criticism of the naval secretary did not abate.  Solons attacked Mallory 
throughout the session, making him a principal scapegoat for New Orleans’s capture by 
Union forces.  Henry Foote used the occasion for one of his typically vituperative 
remarks on February 3, when he wished aloud that Davis’s cabinet be “purified of those 
whose very breath was contamination and death.”125  On March 9, Senator Clement C. 
Clay issued a resolution calling for the investigation of “the management of the Navy 
under its present head.”  While Mallory was personally unpopular with many in the upper 
house, a majority of senators did not think an additional inquiry into his conduct was 
necessary.  After all, a joint committee in the previous session assigned to investigate 
Mallory could not yet find substantial evidence justifying action against him.126 
Despite the intermittent squabbling that pervaded the First Congress’s final 
session, a reconciliation of sorts occurred.  Naval secretary Stephen Mallory was finally 
exonerated from allegations of incompetence and dereliction.  On February 16, Congress 
passed a bill for a voluntary navy, which allowed the secretary of the navy 
commissioning powers over vessels both inside and out of Confederate waters.127  The 
passage of the proposed law for a volunteer navy portended findings from an eighteen-
month investigation into the secretary’s conduct.  On February 17, the joint committee 
looking into Mallory’s actions in the naval department found “no sufficient cause for 
shame or discouragement in the operations of our navy.”  Instead, it cited the tightening 
Union blockade and a lack of resources.  Even more surprising was the absence of a 
minority report from committee members like Henry Foote or Louisianans Thomas 
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Semmes or Lucius Jacques Dupre, who had previously lambasted Mallory.128  Although 
there are no surviving committee minutes, excluding the final report submitted to both 
Houses, the apparent paucity of potentially damning evidence must account for the 
unforeseen silence from Foote, a notorious malcontent.   
 
●      ●      ● 
 
Despite the personal misgivings harbored by some congressmen towards Davis, 
few doubted his war policies.  Little organized opposition existed in Congress.  The 
legislative branch’s approval of his cabinet ministers displayed Congress’s confidence in 
the men Davis chose to administer his war plans; the endorsement of an overwhelming 
majority of the president’s military appointments showed congressional faith in the men 
selected to fight and die for the cause.  Although a vocal minority protested the growing 
war powers of the chief executive, most congressmen were willing to concede legislative 
powers in exchange for their best chances of survival.  Consequently, the Provisional and 
First Congresses cooperated with most of Davis’s war policy, enacting conscription 
legislation, suspending the writ of habeas corpus when legislators deemed it necessary, 
and usually agreeing with his military appointments.  Few seriously contemplated Henry 
S. Foote’s cries for “the people to rise, sword in hand, to put down the domestic tyrant 
who thus sought to invade their rights.”  With the fate of a nation being uncertain, most 
congressmen and citizens remained loyal to their commander in chief.129 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The noted Confederate diarist Mary Chesnut had no love for the Confederate 
Congress.  She asserted that congressmen conspired to ruin Jefferson Davis’s policies, 
and even feared that some wished to depose him.  “We are so busy fighting each other,” 
she lamented.  “Confederate Congress exhausts itself, vituperating Jeff Davis.  To 
hamper, harass, and thwart seems their entire duty.”1   
Mary Chesnut’s fears were largely unfounded.  While congressional debates 
about Davis and his guiding principles became venomous on occasion, Jefferson Davis’s 
opposition in the Provisional and First Confederate Congresses was inchoate and 
fragmented.  Although the president and his supporters encountered resistance over 
military and domestic policies, Davis’s critics never coalesced.  For every Henry S. Foote 
or Louis T. Wigfall, who ardently contested many of Davis’s centralization efforts simply 
because they disliked the president, there were considerably more politicians like Edward 
Sparrow or Clement C. Clay, whose confrontations with the president focused on single 
questions.  Excluding the intermittent objection to a questionable economic policy or 
draft exemption, most congressmen agreed with their president’s policies.   
The Journal of the Confederate Congress and the Southern Historical Society 
Papers show that the Provisional and First Congresses complied with most of Davis’s 
demands.  While he may not have always gotten exactly what he wanted, such as total 
control of all draft-aged men, he did receive congressional endorsement for the first series 
of draft laws in American history, which eventually placed tens of thousands of men in 
the ranks.  Although his requests for conscription legislation and the suspension of habeas 
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corpus offended the sensibilities of some states’ rightists and civil libertarians, most in 
Congress gave top priority to general defense and usually acceded to his demands.  The 
same concerns for national survival also led many in Congress to comply with most of 
the economic requests posed by Davis and Secretary of the Treasury Christopher 
Memminger, however questionable they may have found these proposals.  Unfortunately 
for the Confederate cause, most congressmen were even less astute in matters of finance 
than the executive branch was, and the southern economy was in shambles by 1864.2  
Even so, an overwhelming majority in Congress retained their faith in their commander 
in chief, especially when they considered Davis’s choices for military office and strategy.  
With the nation’s survival contingent on success in the field, most chose to defer to their 
president, who was far more experienced in military administration.   
There was no concerted thrust to block Davis’s measures.  The Confederacy’s 
absence of political parties precluded an organized oppositional bloc for the duration of 
its existence.  Although disgruntled individuals made sporadic efforts to obstruct the 
president’s policies, most put their politics aside and labored for national survival. 
Enmity typically occurred among small factions. Instead, the Provisional and First 
Congresses rallied behind their president, establishing the domestic and military 
framework that endured until war’s end.   
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